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Introduction 
 
The United States of America’s official seal is inscribed with the quote “E Pluribus 
Unum.”  Translated from the Latin, this phrase means “From Many, One.”i  Modern America 
is in fact one nation, built from many; many cultures, religions, and citizens from many 
different origins comprise the American polity.  America is a nation of immigrants.  The first 
immigrants to this country were fleeing religious persecution.  Others have come escaping a 
life of poverty or political repression.  Whatever the reason, immigrants come to America in 
hope of a better life.   
Despite America’s strong immigrant tradition, the issue of membership in the 
American polity has been a contentious issue throughout our history.  Chinese Exclusion, and 
the National Origins Quota System are merely two policies implemented with the express 
purpose of keeping foreigners out of America.  Over time, anti-immigrant sentiment in 
America has been fueled by nativism and the desire to allow economic prosperity to benefit 
American citizens.  While nativism has played an important role in determining American 
immigration policy, many modern-day arguments for a restrictive immigration policy are 
based on economic considerations.  It is often claimed that immigrants take jobs away from 
citizens.  Economic research has shown that modern-day immigrants tend to be lower skilled 
and have a lower economic performance than natives.ii  As a result, the presence of a large 
number of immigrants does create greater job competition and lower wages for citizens in 
low-paying jobs.iii  The desire to keep jobs available for American citizens has been a 
primary cause of existing restrictions on immigration.    
While immigrants can have a negative affect on the American economy, history 
indicates that a large immigrant labor force has allowed the United States to develop into the 
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modern industrial nation that it is today.  During times of economic development, American 
immigration policy was expanded in order to create the necessary labor force.  For example, 
during the development of the American railroad, Western states and railroad companies 
recruited German farmers to immigrate to the American West.iv  Also, the federal 
government’s Homestead Act of 1862 guaranteed “160 acres of [western] land free to 
citizens and aliens who worked it for at least five years.”v  Another example is from the 
early-mid 1900s.  During the two World Wars, Congress allowed Mexican farmworkers to 
enter the United States for the express purpose of working in the agriculture industry.vi  
Without these workers, the agriculture industry would not have been able to support 
American wartime production.  Determining modern immigration policy involves finding a 
delicate balance between America’s immigrant history and the negative affects of 
immigration.  Economist George J. Borjas, explains this as a struggle of weighing American 
values against economic facts.vii   
In recent years, immigration policy has grown to include more than simply laws about 
who can come to America and how many of them can come.  It now also involves what 
rights are afforded to immigrants before they become full citizens, what is often referred to as 
immigrant policy.  Immigration law scholar Peter H. Schuck points out that, “United States 
citizenship… confers few legal or economic advantages over the status of permanent resident 
alien.”viii  Thus, manipulating the difference between the rights accorded to noncitizens and 
the rights accorded to citizens is often used as a means to achieve the United States’ 
immigration goals.ix  The trend of using immigrant policy to engage in immigration 
policymaking represents a new tactic for dealing with immigrants to the United States.    
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This trend was brought to a new level when the United States Congress passed the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996.  
While the primary purpose of this law was to reform the nation’s welfare system, these 
reforms included restrictions on the extent to which legally present immigrants could receive 
public benefits.  This law marks the first time that such restrictions were placed on legally 
present immigrants.  Prior to this law, immigrant policy had dealt primarily with policies 
towards illegally present immigrants.  The 1996 welfare reform law expanded immigrant 
policy to include legal immigrants by limiting the extent to which legal immigrants could 
receive welfare benefits.  The law accomplished this in two ways.  First, PRWORA changed 
federal eligibility categories to include the date an immigrant arrived in the country.  Many 
immigrants that entered the country after PRWORA was signed into law on August 22, 1996 
no longer qualify for welfare benefits.  Second, of those immigrants that still qualify for 
welfare, PRWORA gave states greater discretion in determining whether or not immigrants 
would be eligible for welfare programs.x   
The PRWORA legislation is significant in two ways.  First, it further blurs the 
distinction between immigrant policy and immigration policy, making it necessary to 
consider whether or not such a distinction still exists.  Second, the law gives state 
governments significant control in the area of immigrant/immigration policymaking, 
something which seems to be in conflict with the federal government’s responsibility over 
immigration policy.xi  The devolution of immigrant/immigration policy creates important 
questions regarding the status of American federalism.          
This paper will examine issues surrounding the immigrant provisions of the 1996 
welfare reform law.  It seeks to examine whether or not a distinction between immigrant 
  
 
7
policy and immigration policy still exists.  Also, the paper will consider the extent to which 
the devolution of immigrant/immigration policy has changed American federalism.  In order 
to understand the influence of PRWORA, it is first necessary to understand how the law has 
changed immigrant eligibility to welfare.  For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on 
changes made to the three primary programs of assistance in the United States; cash 
assistance for families (Aid to Families with Dependent Children- AFDC which became 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families-TANF), cash assistance for the elderly and 
disabled (Supplemental Security Income- SSI) and Food Stamps.  In Chapter One I will 
establish the extent to which noncitizens were able to participate in these welfare programs 
prior to the 1996 law and then consider how the law changed this eligibility.   
Next, in Chapter Two, I will examine the political forces which impacted the creation 
of PRWORA.  This chapter will include a review of the forces which have influenced 
immigration policy throughout American history.  After documenting the framework in 
which immigration policies are traditionally discussed, I will consider how new factors 
influenced the policy debate in 1996.  Review of the political environment in the early 1990s, 
makes it clear that a primary cause of the immigrant eligibility restrictions in PRWORA was 
an economic downturn, something that ultimately resulted in anti-immigrant sentiment.  The 
restriction of welfare benefits was used primarily as a means of discouraging immigration, a 
goal that has typically been accomplished through immigration policy.  Since PRWORA 
clearly uses immigrant policymaking to accomplish immigration goals, it seems that the 
distinction between immigration policy and immigrant policy is no longer significant.       
In Chapter Three I will begin to consider the extent to which PRWORA has changed 
federal-state relations.  This chapter will first review the specific ways in which the federal 
  
 
8
government has devolved some control of immigrant policy to the states.  Next, I will 
document the manner in which states have responded to these increased policymaking 
responsibilities.  Specifically, this chapter will include a case study of the manner in which 
four states have responded to PRWORA.  The states of California, Massachusetts, Colorado 
and Texas have been chosen for the case study.  Each state will be analyzed in light of what 
welfare benefits are available to immigrants and the political forces that have created each 
state’s policies.  Comparison of the responses by these states reveals that while states might 
have similar experiences with immigrants, political forces unique to each state caused a 
variety of responses to PRWORA.      
Finally, in the Conclusion, I will specifically examine the extent to which PRWORA 
has changed the nature of American federalism.  I conclude that PRWORA has distinctly 
changed American federalism because it gave states significant control over immigration 
policy, something which had previously been controlled by the federal government.  In 
closing, I suggest that while states have gained power in significant policy areas, such as 
welfare and immigration, the devolution of this power to the states reaffirms that within 
American federalism, power is ultimately derived from the states.   
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Chapter One 
 
Welfare Eligibility: History and Changes 
 
 In 1996 the United States Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), drastically changing the structure of the 
country’s social welfare system.  One of the fundamental changes made by PRWORA was to 
cause a closer scrutiny of citizenship status when determining eligibility for welfare 
programs.  Before PRWORA, legally present aliens were eligible to receive welfare benefits 
on similar terms as citizens.  PRWORA changed this by making welfare benefits available 
only to certain groups of legally present immigrants.  In order to show how PRWORA 
changed the nature of immigrant eligibility to welfare, this chapter will examine both the 
legislative and judicial case histories which have shaped eligibility requirements.  After 
showing the level of immigrant eligibility to the safety net before 1996, the chapter will 
examine how PRWORA changed this eligibility level.    
Eligibility: Legislative History 
Aid to Families With Dependent Children   
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act most 
drastically changed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), which 
until 1996 was the primary source of cash assistance for families in the United States.  The 
1996 law replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
program.  AFDC had been established by the Social Security Act of 1935.xii  In its original 
form, AFDC was a cash assistance program for children.  Cash assistance for parents was 
added at a later time.  AFDC was a joint entitlement program with responsibility shared 
between the federal government and the states.  The federal government funded the program 
while states determined financial need and other eligibility issues, and determined the level 
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of benefits given.xiii  While the federal government was ultimately responsible for making 
payments to the states to fund the program, the levels of these payments were determined by 
the varying state eligibility requirements.  In this sense, “the federal government [was] 
hostage to state policies since state appropriations and caseloads determine[d] the amount the 
federal government [spent] on AFDC.” xiv  Many states took advantage of this flexibility and 
used eligibility requirements to discriminate against minorities and impose moral standards 
on welfare recipients.  For example, some states imposed “man in the house” rules which 
“terminated or reduced benefits where there was a cohabitating male resident.”xv  While the 
federal government viewed the AFDC program as a way of providing assistance to needy 
people, state governments often used eligibility requirements to accomplish other goals.     
Through a series of lawsuits in the 1960s and 1970s, the federal Courts attempted to 
exert some control over eligibility to the AFDC program.  The Supreme Court overturned 
many of the discriminatory requirements which had been imposed by the states.  The 
eligibility requirements overturned by the Court were those “unrelated to need,”xvi 
emphasizing the program’s purpose of providing aid to needy people.  The Supreme Court 
case of Graham v. Richardson (1971) is a specific example of how the Court overturned 
state-imposed eligibility requirements related to citizenship.  In this situation, the state of 
Arizona had imposed a fifteen-year waiting period for noncitizens to qualify for welfare 
benefits.  This state-imposed restriction for AFDC did not survive because strict scrutiny of 
the Equal Protection Clause was applied.  Prior to the Graham ruling, a similar requirement 
had existed in Pennsylvania.xvii  While states such as Arizona and Pennsylvania attempted to 
use the flexibility of the AFDC program to exclude noncitizens, such provisions were 
overturned by the federal government during the judicial review process.    
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Supplemental Security Income 
Like AFDC, the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) provides cash 
assistance to low-income people.  However, SSI is targeted specifically towards low-income 
people with disabilities and the elderly.  The purpose of the program is “to supplement the 
income of aged and handicapped people so they can have a minimum standard of living.”xviii  
The SSI program was established in 1974 through amendments to the Social Security Act 
and it is administered through the Social Security Administration.   
Since SSI is administered at the federal level, the program has national uniformity in 
both eligibility requirements and benefit levels.  In order to qualify for the program, a person 
must be over age 65, blind, physically or psychologically disabled, and meet certain income 
and financial asset requirements.  These requirements were established in 1974 when the law 
was first enacted.xix   
Food Stamps 
The Food Stamp program was established in 1964 by the Food Stamp Act, and is 
administered by the Office of Food and Nutritional Services at the United States Department 
of Agriculture.  The program was designed to enable “low-income families to buy nutritious 
food.”xx  People who participate in the Food Stamp program receive their benefits in the form 
of coupons or on debit cards.  The benefits are then used to purchase designated food items at 
grocery stores. 
The Food Stamp program is funded jointly by the federal government and states.  The 
federal government pays for benefits, while the federal and state governments share 
administrative costs.xxi  Although the program was established in 1964, legislation passed in 
the late 1970s significantly strengthened the program.  Most importantly this legislation 
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established “uniform national income and asset eligibility standards.”xxii  The standards 
established at that time remained in place until PRWORA was passed in 1996.     
The eligibility standards established in the late 1970s involved several tests of need.  
These needs tests separately examine an applicant’s available financial resources and the 
applicant’s income.  According to the resource test, an applicant can have up to $2,000 in 
bank accounts, stocks and bonds, and property value (not counting the home), and still 
qualify to receive food stamp benefits.xxiii  Benefits received from other welfare programs, 
such as TANF and SSI, are not counted against the $2,000 resource limit.xxiv  The income test 
for eligibility considers a household’s gross monthly income minus specified deductions.  
The calculated amount is the household’s net monthly income.  In order to qualify for food 
stamp benefits, a household must fall below designated limits for both the gross monthly 
income and the net monthly income.  These limits are adjusted annually.  For the FY 2002, 
the gross monthly income limit for a household of four was $1,913.  The net monthly income 
limit was $1,471.xxv  Like SSI, eligibility requirements for the Food Stamp program are 
determined by the federal government and are thus uniform nationwide.   
As evidenced by the legislative history of AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamps, Congress 
had done little before 1996 to either restrict or protect legally present noncitizens’ eligibility.  
As a result, noncitizens were able to access benefits on a similar level as citizens.  While 
before PRWORA the U.S. Congress did little to either discriminate against or protect 
noncitizens’ ability to access welfare benefits, the same cannot be said for the judicial 
branch.  Prior to 1996, the process of judicial review enabled the Courts to be the primary 
institution defining the extent to which noncitizens were able to receive welfare benefits.   
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Eligibility: Case History 
 The two Constitutional directives that have influenced the Court’s decisions dealing 
with noncitizen eligibility to welfare are the Equal Protection Clause of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments and the Supremacy Clause contained in Article I of the Constitution.  The 1886 
Supreme Court decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins established the precedent that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment applies to aliens residing in the United States.  This 
means that, like citizens, immigrants are entitled to equal protection of the law.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Graham v. Richardson (1971) expanded the equal protection of 
noncitizens to apply to welfare laws.  In this decision, the Court struck down Arizona’s 
fifteen-year waiting period for aliens to qualify for welfare and Pennsylvania’s bar on 
noncitizen participation in the state welfare program.  With this decision, the Supreme Court 
indicated that “aliens [are] a ‘suspect class’ and ‘a prime example of a discreet and insular 
minority.’”xxvi  The use of the term ‘suspect class’ indicates that strict scrutiny was used in 
reviewing the state of Arizona’s legislation.  In equal protection cases, the Court can apply 
either standard or strict scrutiny.  Strict scrutiny is used only when the law as deals with 
“fundamental rights” or a class needing special protection (a suspect class).xxvii  Under strict 
scrutiny, legislation typically only survives “where it serves a ‘compelling state 
interest.’”xxviii  In the Graham case, the states of Arizona and Pennsylvania cited the interest 
of conserving welfare funds for citizens.  The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an 
adequate state interest because both citizens and aliens paid taxes and thus contributed to 
funding for welfare programs.xxix Since these statutes did not constitute a compelling state 
interest, they were overturned.   
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 The second Constitutional provision influencing judicial review of legislation dealing 
with noncitizens’ eligibility to welfare programs is the Supremacy Clause contained in 
Article I of the Constitution.  One of the first cases that used the Supremacy Clause to define 
the federal government’s ability to apply citizenship status as an eligibility criterion for 
welfare benefits was Mathews v. Diaz (1976).  This case dealt with a provision of the Social 
Security Act stipulating that noncitizens were only eligible to the Medicaid program if they 
had resided in the country for at least five years.  As opposed to the Graham case, which 
dealt with a state law, the Mathews case dealt with the Social Security Act, a federal law.  
The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that it was within the power of Congress and the 
federal government to make distinctions between citizens and aliens.  Furthermore, the ruling 
indicated that it was within the federal government’s power to make distinctions between 
different immigrant classifications.  The opinion, written by Justice Stevens, stated that since 
immigrant classification is “defined in the light of changing political and economic 
circumstances,” it is best to allow decisions about immigrant classification to be made by 
either the legislative or the executive branch of the federal government.xxx   
Mathews v. Diaz was also significant in defining the federal government’s ability to 
use citizenship status as a criterion for welfare eligibility because it clarified the issue of 
scrutiny towards the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice Stevens’ decision refuted the idea that 
the precedent of strict scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause should be applied to this case.  
This precedent had been established by Graham v. Richardson, a case that “concern[ed] the 
relationship between aliens and the States.”xxxi In contrast, Mathews v. Diaz dealt with the 
relationship “between aliens and the Federal Government.”xxxii  Since the Equal Protection 
Clause does not apply to the federal government, it is possible for the federal government to 
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distinguish both between aliens and citizens and among different classifications of 
noncitizens.   
The precedent of applying the Supremacy Clause to issues dealing with immigration 
was strengthened by the April 1977 decision in Fiallo v. Bell.  This ruling formally 
established the “federal doctrine of preemption.”xxxiii  This doctrine suggests “that the federal 
government exclusively has plenary power over matters of immigration and 
naturalization.”xxxiv  In combination, the rulings in both Mathews and Fiallo established as 
the sole power of the federal government the ability to make citizenship status an eligibility 
criterion for receiving welfare benefits.   
The apparent shift between the rulings made in Graham and then in Mathews and 
Fiallo can be understood by considering the historical context in which the Court made these 
decisions.  The Graham ruling was made in 1971, a mere two years after the resignation of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, an event which represents the formal end of the judicial era 
known as the Warren Court.  The era of the Warren Court is understood as a time period in 
which the Court “implemented the modern liberal agenda, enforcing norms of fair treatment 
and racial equality.”xxxv  The ruling in Graham fulfills this understanding of the Court by 
prohibiting state restrictions which are a barrier to immigrants receiving welfare benefits.  In 
contrast, the Mathews and Fiallo rulings came further along in the period in which Warren 
Burger was Chief Justice.  By affirming the ability of the federal government to discriminate 
on the basis of alien status, the Mathews and Fiallo rulings fulfill the traditional 
understanding of the Burger Court as more restrictionist than the Warren Court.xxxvi  While 
the Court’s shift between the decisions in Graham and then Mathews and Fiallo uphold the 
traditional stereotypes of the Warren Court as expanding rights and the Burger Court as more 
  
 
16
restrictionist, a subsequent Court ruling dealing with Equal Protection and the Supremacy 
Clause disproves this generalization.   
The rulings made in Graham, Mathews, and Fiallo were further clarified by the June 
1977 decision in Nyquist v. Mauclet.  This decision invalidated a New York state law which 
prevented noncitizens from receiving financial aid, unless they intended to apply for 
citizenship.  The ruling in Nyquist upheld the precedent established in Graham rather than 
the precedent established in Mathews and Fiallo.  Since the statute in question made a 
distinction based on alien status and had been imposed by the State of New York, rather than 
the federal government, it was subject to strict scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause.  The 
decision in Nyquist rejected the lesser level of scrutiny that had been applied in Mathews 
because Mathews had dealt with a federal law.   
After applying strict scrutiny to the New York law, the Court identified two possible 
state interests.  The first and most significant was to create an incentive for naturalization.  
This goal was rejected as a compelling state interest because of the Supremacy Clause rulings 
made in Mathews and Fiallo.  Since issues of immigration and naturalization are “entrusted 
exclusively to the Federal Government,” encouraging naturalization cannot be a reasonable 
state interest.xxxvii Although the Nyquist ruling was made after the Supremacy Clause 
precedent had been established by Mathews and then upheld in Fiallo, the fact that Nyquist 
dealt with a state law caused the Court to defer to the Equal Protection precedent that had 
been established in Graham.   
Examined in the historical context of the Court, Nyquist confuses the traditionally 
held understandings of the Warren and Burger Courts.  Instead, this ruling supports a second 
understanding of the relationship between the two judicial eras.  That is, that after the end of 
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the Warren era the “Court slowly shift[ed] from the premises of the Warren Court but never 
fully repudiat[ed] them.”xxxviii  While decisions such as Mathews and Fiallo indicate a shift 
away from the inclusiveness of the Warren Court, rulings of the Burger Court maintained a 
level of expansion of the Equal Protection Clause.  The Nyquist ruling maintains the Equal 
Protection Clause standard that had been established in Graham.       
In conclusion, the case history dealing with citizenship status and eligibility for 
welfare to establishes two distinctions.  First, given the Constitutional rights provided by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments, it is not possible for states to deny 
benefits based on citizenship status.  Since the Court has determined that noncitizens qualify 
as a “suspect class,” and thus need special protection from the Court, a state must show a 
“compelling state interest” in order to overcome the strict scrutiny that is applied to Equal 
Protection claims.  The second precedent established by the Court has been the Federal 
Government’s right, under the Supremacy Clause, to deny welfare benefits based on alien 
status.  The case history provides an indication of the extent to which it is possible for 
Congress to deny benefits based on citizenship status.   
Eligibility Requirements: Citizenship  
The case history given by the Supreme Court and dealing with alien eligibility to 
welfare programs clearly shows that any restrictions must come from the federal government.  
Prior to PRWORA, the extent to which Congress exercised its power to discriminate on the 
basis of citizenship status was very minimal.  Furthermore, the federal government imposed 
uniform eligibility requirements for noncitizen participation in AFDC, SSI, and the Food 
Stamp program.    
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One of the first federally imposed requirements dealt with which groups of 
immigrants were able to receive welfare benefits.  According to Congressional legislation, all 
legally present immigrants, including those permanently residing under the color of law 
(PRUCOL),1 were eligible to receive cash assistance (through either AFDC or SSI) and Food 
Stamps.   
The second federal limitation placed on immigrants dealt with how an applicant’s 
financial eligibility was determined.  For immigrants with sponsors, the sponsor’s income 
was “deemed” available to that immigrant for their first three years in the country.xxxix  This 
rule affected immigrants when they applied for public benefits because the welfare office 
would consider the income of the sponsor available to the immigrant when calculating 
financial eligibility.  This meant that for the first three years in the United States, immigrants 
were considered to have a higher income than they actually might have had.  It was possible 
for Congress to include this provision in welfare eligibility rules because of a provision in 
immigration law which requires some immigrants to have a sponsor.  The State Department 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)2 require immigrants who might 
become a public charge3 to have a sponsor.  This person must sign an affidavit of support, in 
which they become legally obligated to be financially responsible for the immigrant.  Thus, 
the federal rule regarding sponsor deeming was in accordance with U.S. immigration law.  
Under welfare eligibility rules, these affidavits were considered “to be morally, rather than 
                                                          
1 PRUCOL is an immigration status referring to immigrants that are Permanently Residing Under the Color of 
Law.  The term PRUCOL includes immigrants that can prove that the INS knows they are in the U.S. and that 
they are not under an order of deportation.  This would include asylum applicants.   
2 Immigration visas are granted by both institutions 
3 Public charge is an immigration term referring to immigrants that are likely to become “primarily dependent 
on the government for subsistence” either by receiving cash welfare benefits or through long-term 
institutionalization.    
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legally, binding”xl and often the deeming rule was leniently enforced upon immigrants 
applying for benefits.   
One small difference in deeming rules applied to the SSI program.  For much of the 
program’s history, sponsor deeming occurred for an immigrant’s first three years in the 
country. This was the same length of time as in the AFDC and Food Stamp programs.  
However, as a result of significant immigrant use of SSI benefits, this length of time was 
extended to five years, beginning January 1, 1994.   
In closing, the extent to which the federal government exercised its right, granted by 
the Supremacy Clause, to restrict immigrants from receiving benefits was minimal.  
Considering the eligibility history of AFDC, SSI, and the Food Stamp program, the 
restrictions imposed by PRWORA represent a drastic shift in the ability of immigrant 
families to receive welfare benefits in the United States.   
Eligibility Changes Made by PRWORA  
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) was signed into law on August 22, 1996.  The most significant change made by 
this legislation was to replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) 
with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  TANF contained work requirements 
and limits on the length of time participants could receive benefits.  Also, the new TANF 
program was funded through block grants to the states, rather than the federal government 
matching state spending, as in AFDC.  While PRWORA had a specific and drastic affect on 
the AFDC program, it represents a larger shift in the nature of benefits policy in the United 
States.  PRWORA marks the first time that the federal government firmly acted upon its 
ability to exclude noncitizens from participation in public benefits programs.  Until this 
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point, the extent to which the federal government exercised this right was minimal.  With 
PRWORA, the federal government imposed widespread restrictions on the ability of 
noncitizens to receive cash assistance, disability benefits, and food stamps.    
 Before examining the immigrant eligibility requirements established by PRWORA, it 
is necessary to understand the language introduced for describing different categories of 
immigrants.  The first level of distinction is between pre- and post-enactment immigrants.  
Pre-enactment immigrants, those legally present in the U.S. when the law was passed on 
August 22, 1996, remain eligible for more benefits than post-enactment immigrants, those 
that entered after this date.  The next distinction is for certain groups of immigrants.  These 
include refugees and asylees during their first several years in the country, immigrants who 
have 40 quarters of work history, or immigrants who have served in the U.S. military.  
PRWORA tends to exempt these groups from many of the eligibility restrictions.  In this 
provision of the law, Congress is acting on one of the rights granted to the federal 
government in Mathews v. Diaz (1976).  This decision granted Congress the right to consider 
“the character of the relationship between the alien and this country.”xli  With this provision, 
Congress recognizes that those immigrants who have worked in the United States for a 
considerable amount of time or who have served the United States in the military have a 
greater “claim to an equal share” of the country’s wealth.xlii     
The final distinction is between qualified and unqualified immigrants.  Before 
PRWORA only undocumented immigrants fell into the unqualified category.  This changed 
because PRWORA designates specific immigration categories as qualified, thus any 
immigrants not included in the qualified category automatically enter the unqualified 
category.  Qualified immigrants included lawful permanent residents, immigrants admitted 
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for humanitarian reasons (refugees/asylees), battered spouses and their children (who can 
petition for entrance under the Violence Against Women Act), and people paroled into the 
United States for at least one year.xliii  By default, PRUCOL immigrants, such as asylum 
applicants and those with temporary statuses, such as students and tourists, are unqualified 
immigrants.     
Chart 1.1- PRWORA Classifications of Immigrants 
Classification By: Tend To Be Eligible For More Benefits Tend To Be Eligible For Fewer Benefits  
Entry Date Pre-Enactment Immigrants 
• Entered the U.S. BEFORE 
August 22, 1996 
Post-Enactment Immigrants  
• Entered the U.S. AFTER August 
22, 1996 
Exemptions  Exempted Groups 
• 40 Quarters of work history 
(approximately 10 years); 
Credits can be transferred from a 
parent or spouse 
• Military personnel and their 
families 
• Refugees/Asylees 
Non-Exempted Groups 
• Immigrants that do not fall into 
any of the three Exempted 
categories 
Qualified vs. Unqualified Qualified  
• Legal Permanent Residents  
• Refugees/Asylees 
• Parolees (enter for 1 year) 
• Battered spouses and children 
Unqualified 
• Any immigrant not falling into 
the Qualified categories 
• Illegal Immigrants 
• Asylum applicants 
• PRUCOLs 
• Immigrants with temporary 
statuses (students and tourists) 
 
AFDC Becomes TANF 
 Under the AFDC program, state governments had considerable freedom to determine 
eligibility requirements.  Throughout the history of the program, judicial review established a 
precedent which prevented states from discriminating on the basis of citizenship status.  
Because PRWORA established TANF as a block grant program, states actually gained 
authority in determining whether or not to provide assistance to specific groups of their 
population.   
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While PRWORA established a federal law barring many categories of immigrants 
from receiving TANF for the first five years in the country, it also gave state governments 
the power to determine whether immigrants would be eligible for TANF after the five-year 
bar.  As a result of the welfare reform changes, individual states now determine whether or 
not a given group of immigrants is eligible to receive cash assistance benefits.   
SSI and Food Stamps 
 Unlike the changes made to AFDC/TANF, the 1996 welfare reform law did little to 
change the structure or administration of either the SSI or Food Stamp programs; these 
programs remain funded and administered by the federal government.  The changes that were 
made to these programs deal with eligibility requirements.  Since SSI and the Food Stamp 
program are both administered by the federal government, PRWORA enacted identical 
eligibility requirements for these programs.     
 According to the original PRWORA legislation, post-enactment, qualified immigrants 
were barred from receiving either SSI or Food Stamps.  Furthermore, any pre-enactment 
immigrants not part of the exempted groups would become ineligible for SSI and Food 
Stamps.  Given this ineligibility, any pre-enactment, non-exempted immigrants receiving SSI 
or Food Stamps at the time of PRWORA would lose these benefits.  In short, the PRWORA 
legislation meant that most legal immigrants would be ineligible for SSI or Food Stamps 
until they became citizens or gained 40 quarters of work history (this would take 
approximately 10 years), thus becoming exempted from many of the PRWORA restrictions.  
It was noted that within the Food Stamp program, the immigrant restrictions “mark the first 
time in history… that food stamp benefits will be denied to some groups who meet its 
income requirements.”xliv  While the original PRWORA legislation imposed similar 
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citizenship eligibility requirements for both SSI and Food Stamps, subsequent restorations 
made to each program have ultimately meant the SSI and Food Stamp programs vary in their 
availability to immigrants.   
Chart 1.2- Changes in Immigrant Eligibility to Welfare Programs 
  
AFDC/TANF 
 
SSI 
 
Food Stamps 
Pre-Graham ¾ States have significant 
freedom to determine 
eligibility requirements. 
¾ Some states, such as 
Arizona and Pennsylvania 
implement 15 year waiting 
periods for aliens to 
receive benefits. 
¾ The federal government 
also imposes some 
restrictions: illegal aliens 
ineligible and sponsor-
deeming.   
¾ A federally 
administered 
program; all 
restrictions come 
from the federal 
government: illegal 
aliens ineligible and 
sponsor-deeming. 
 
¾ A federally 
administered 
program; all 
restrictions come 
from the federal 
government: illegal 
aliens ineligible and 
sponsor-deeming. 
 
Post-Graham ¾ State laws discriminating 
on the basis of citizenship 
are overturned. 
¾ Federally imposed 
restrictions still in place.   
¾ No Effect.  
 
 
¾ In January 1994 the 
sponsor-deeming 
period is extended 
from 3 to 5 years.  
This change only 
affects SSI.   
¾ No Effect.  
Post-1996 ¾ Federal restrictions bar 
qualified immigrants from 
welfare for their first 5 
years in the country.  
¾ New sponsor affidavits 
that are legally binding. 
¾ States have the power to 
determine whether or not 
to include immigrants in 
welfare programs.  
¾ Most groups of 
immigrants 
ineligible until 
citizenship, some 
groups are exempted 
from this bar.   
¾ Qualified groups 
barred for their first 
5 years in the 
country.  
¾ New sponsor 
affidavits that are 
legally binding.   
¾ Most groups of 
immigrants 
ineligible until 
citizenship, some 
groups are exempted 
from this bar. 
¾ Qualified groups 
barred for their first 
5 years in the 
country.  
¾ New sponsor 
affidavits that are 
legally binding.   
  
Limited Restorations 
 When President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act on August 22, 1996, it was widely known that he opposed the immigrant 
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eligibility provisions of the law.xlv  President Clinton is said to have “beg[un] proposing 
changes to the law even before the ink was dry.”xlvi  As a result of these efforts, eligibility to 
some programs has been restored to some categories of legal immigrants.   
Given the impact of PRWORA on many elderly and disabled immigrants receiving 
SSI, restorations were first made within this program.  In the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
Congress restored SSI eligibility to immigrants that had been participating in the program on 
August 22, 1996 and to pre-enactment immigrants that subsequently become disabled.xlvii  
The following year Congress restored food stamp eligibility to a similar segment of the 
immigrant population.  Eligibility for food stamp benefits was restored to elderly and 
disabled immigrants who were in the country when PRWORA was passed.  In addition, 
immigrants under age 18 who were in the country on August 22, 1996 were once again able 
to receive food stamps.  Finally, in this round of restorations, Congress extended the time 
which refugees and asylees could receive food stamps from five to seven years.xlviii 
These initial restorations made within the SSI and Food Stamp programs applied to 
relatively vulnerable segments of the immigrant population, that is, the elderly, disabled, and 
children.  In 2002, during the reauthorization of the PRWORA reforms, widespread 
restorations were made to the Food Stamp program.  The 2002 Farm Bill restored food stamp 
eligibility to qualified immigrants that have been living in the United States for five years, 
qualified immigrant children regardless of entry date, and qualified immigrants that are 
receiving SSI, regardless of entry date.   
In closing, PRWORA represents a drastic shift in the nature of United States benefits 
policy towards immigrants.  As a result of PRWORA, it became necessary to consider an 
applicant’s citizenship status when determining eligibility for cash assistance, disability 
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benefits, or food stamps.  The eligibility changes dealing with citizenship made by the 1996 
welfare reform law represent the first time that the federal government widely distinguished 
between citizens and noncitizens in the distribution of welfare benefits.   
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Chapter Two 
Immigration Policy: Political Forces 
In addition to drastically changing the nature of benefits policy, the immigrant 
eligibility provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 (PRWORA) mark a significant shift within the immigration policy framework.  
The restrictions further blur the distinction between immigrant policy and immigration 
policy, making it necessary to consider whether or not a distinction still exists.  In order to 
understand how the law changes immigration policy, it is necessary to review the political 
forces that have affected immigration policy making throughout American history.  After 
establishing the traditional political forces within immigration policy, it is possible to analyze 
how these forces influenced the 1996 welfare reform process.       
Political Forces of the First and Second Immigration Periods 
Throughout American history, immigration policy has been influenced by the 
competing forces of nativism and economics.  The influence of nativism has always 
encouraged limitations on the entry of immigrants.  In contrast, economic considerations 
have the possibility to encourage either a liberal or restrictive immigration policy, depending 
on the needs of the country.  In early America, economic forces made it necessary to have a 
liberal immigration policy.  This early policy established a precedent of imposing minimal 
restrictions on immigration.  Daniel Tichenor suggests that this precedent is an example of 
path dependence within American political institutions and public policy.xlix  The generosity 
of early immigration policy created political forces that have been difficult for Nativist 
movements to overcome.    
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Nativism 
Nativism has existed in America since the colonial era, and nativist fears have 
adapted as the types of immigrants to America have changed.  John Hingham identifies two 
phases of American immigration.  The First Immigration lasted from the 1680s through the 
American Revolution.  Immigrants of the First Immigration originated from Northern 
Europe, were white, Protestant, and English speaking.l  Despite the similarity of the first 
immigrants to the early American settlers, nativism existed.  Its influence is evident in 
several Constitutional provisions which limited certain political activities to citizens.  Early 
nativists feared that immigrants would remain loyal to their Old World countries.li  They also 
thought that immigrants presented a threat to the developing American democracy.  It was 
believed that newcomers would not “cherish republican principles, individual liberty, and 
self-government.”lii   Early American nativism originated primarily from a desire to protect 
the newly established American form of government.   
 American nativism began to focus on the ethnic and religious differences of 
immigrants as a result of the Second Immigration.  This phase began during the 1820s and 
ended with the implementation of the National Origins Quota System.  The Second 
Immigration brought immigrants speaking a variety of languages, of different ethnic groups, 
and of religions other than Protestant.liii  During the Second Immigration nativist movements 
became involved in party politics by forming independent third parties and by attempting to 
work with mainstream political parties.  Two of the more notable nativist third parties were 
the anti-Masons, formed in response to the influx of German and Irish Catholics during the 
1830s, and the American Party, more commonly referred to as the Know-Nothing movement.  
In their efforts to work with mainstream parties, nativists became involved with the Whigs 
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and the Republicans.  Nativists achieved little success in either of these ventures because of 
their inability to reach a consensus on issues other than immigration and in turn establish the 
necessary partisan and ideological coalitions.  Without such coalitions, Nativist movements 
were focused on one issue, that of reducing immigration to the United States.  The sole focus 
on immigration made it difficult to gain voter support and created problems when other 
significant issues, such as the Civil War, arose.liv  The inability of early Nativists to 
overcome these challenges contributed to the establishment of path dependence within 
immigration policy.   
Near the end of the Second Immigration, nativists began to achieve a limited level of 
success.  Nativist movements embraced theories of eugenics, which applied Darwinian 
principles to human ethnicities and suggested that some races and ethnicities were stronger 
than others.  With the support of these scientific principles, Nativists began to advocate an 
immigration policy that would favor the admission of immigrants from stronger races.lv  
During the early 1900s, the nativist movement was successful in establishing a literacy test to 
ensure that immigrants from weaker races would not be admitted.  In addition to the literacy 
test, the nativist movement strongly supported the implementation of a national origins quota 
system.  Their efforts were successful and the 1921 National Quota Law began a system of 
allotting a specified number of visas for each nationality.  This system was revised with the 
passage of the National Origins Act of 1924, a measure which biased American immigration 
policy towards immigrants from Northern and Western Europe.  The establishment of this 
system represents both the end of the Second Immigration phase and a shift in the approach 
of United States immigration policy.   
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These later Nativist efforts seem to have achieved limited success because of 
structural and political changes within Congress.  In 1890 Congress created standing 
immigration committees.lvi  Also, Progressive reforms made in the early 20th Century 
drastically reduced the traditional role of political parties.lvii  These two changes helped 
nativist movements by creating opportunities to directly influence members of Congress.  
The high-point of Nativist success is the implementation of the National Origins Quota 
system which marks the end of the Second Immigration period.          
Economic Factors   
Throughout the First and Second immigration periods, a competing factor influencing 
immigration policy was economic considerations.  During the First Immigration phase, 
economic considerations led the colonies to encourage immigration to their territories.lviii    
This trend of encouraging immigration continued into the Second Immigration phase.  Many 
Western states and territories even went so far as to use publicity campaigns in order to 
encourage immigration from Europe.lix  During most of the First and Second Immigration 
phases, the economic needs of the developing nation made it possible to have a liberal 
immigration policy.   
Considering the economic events of these time periods, it becomes clear that “labor 
scarcity, abundant territory, and strong yearnings for rapid economic development were all 
factors” influencing the level of restriction in the nation’s immigration policy.lx  During the 
First and Second Immigration phases the United States became independent from England, 
established itself as a new nation, experienced westward expansion, abolished slavery (a 
source of inexpensive labor), and began to develop into an industrial nation.  These economic 
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factors made it necessary to continually expand the American workforce, something 
facilitated by a liberal immigration policy.   
The economic needs of the country were a more powerful force than nativism in 
establishing early immigration policy.  As explained by John Hingham, “… the favorable 
circumstances of the new nation obscured the disparity between ideology and culture.”lxi  
That is, because the country needed a workforce, it was easy for policymakers to overlook 
differences between the American polity and newcomers to the country.  The liberal 
immigration policies of early America facilitated the arrival of large numbers of immigrants.  
As these immigrants became citizens they gained significant influence on the development of 
American immigration policy.  The influence of immigrant and ethnic groups could be seen 
as early as the election of 1800 when voters reacted against attempts by the Federalist Party 
to implement restrictions on immigration.  As a result of public backlash against these 
restrictions, the Democratic-Republicans gained power creating “a long Democratic tradition 
of guarding robust European immigration and alien rights, for which they received electoral 
support from most newcomers.”lxii  This relationship between the Democratic Party and 
ethnic minority groups has allowed the success of pro-immigration efforts and continues to 
be an influential force within modern American politics.  In the late 1800s, the Democratic 
Party received strong support from well-organized Irish voting blocs in large, Eastern cities.  
The ability of pro-immigration forces to construct a coalition of both ethnic and economic 
interests has made it possible to outweigh nativist influences.  This in turn has made it 
difficult to break the precedent of America’s liberal immigration policy.    
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Changing Political Institutions  
An important development that changed the immigration policy process was the shift 
from state to federal control of immigration policy.  During the colonial era, immigration and 
citizenship issues were determined by individual colonies.  Although the Constitution shifted 
responsibility for some policy matters to the newly established federal government, it was 
silent on the issue of immigration and requirements for naturalization.lxiii  The only reference 
to citizenship in the Constitution is citizenship requirements for seeking public office.  
Specific requirements for naturalization were to be established by the first Congress.  This 
Congress established very broad requirements for naturalization and left regulation of 
noncitizen entry to state and local governments.lxiv    
In order to fulfill their responsibility of regulating the entry of aliens, receiving states 
established boards of immigration.  These institutions were meant to ensure the welfare of 
new immigrants rather than to restrict entry to the state.lxv  These boards imposed minimal 
restrictions on who was able to enter their territory, primarily restricting the entry of 
unwanted inhabitants such as criminals, diseased persons, and disabled immigrants likely to 
become a public charge.lxvi  Also, in an attempt to cover the expenses of regulation, the state 
boards of immigration imposed a small tax on immigrants entering the country.lxvii  It was the 
cost of regulating immigration that ultimately shifted control to the federal government.  In 
the 1875 decision Henderson v Mayor of New York, the Supreme Court ruled that the states 
could not tax incoming immigrants.  The Court held that this action infringed upon 
Congress’s right to regulate foreign commerce.lxviii   
After losing their ability to cover the costs associated with regulating the entry of 
aliens, receiving states began to pressure the federal government to assume responsibility for 
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this task.  Given the difficulty of creating a consensus between Southern, Western, and 
Northeastern lawmakers, it took seven years for the federal government to respond.  Finally, 
in 1882 Congress passed a law which gave responsibility for immigration to the Department 
of the Treasury.  In general, the 1882 law simply transferred existing state regulations into 
federal law.  The new federal regulations restricted the entry of “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or 
person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.”lxix  State 
immigration boards continued to regulate immigration.  However they were supervised by 
the federal Treasury Department.   
The next shift of control to the federal government came when Congress created a 
federal board of immigration in 1891.  This action terminated the existence of state 
regulation boards.  This law also expanded the list of restricted groups to include “persons 
suffering from contagious diseases and polygamists.”lxx  The primary effect of shifting 
control from the states to the federal government was the streamlining of the immigration 
policymaking process.  Political institutions, such as congressional committees devoted 
specifically to immigration policy, were created to facilitate the federal government’s new 
role.  The increase in these institutions allowed the nativist movement to be successful in 
implementing restrictive immigration policies during the first half of the 20th Century.   
Immigration Policy After the Second Immigration 
The combination of a streamlined immigration policy process, a rise in nationalism as 
a result of World War I, and the use of eugenic theories in nativist thinking resulted in the 
implementation of a quota system within United States immigration policy.  The use of a 
quota system represents a change in the nature of U.S. immigration policy because for the 
first time a numerical limit existed on the number of visas that would be given annually.  The 
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National Origins Quota System was first established in 1921, however it was quickly 
reformed and made more restrictive by the National Origins Act of 1924.  This law limited 
immigration to 2% per year of each nationality already in the United States and limited the 
total number of visas to 186,437 per year.  The 2% of each nationality was calculated from 
the 1890 census figures.  Finally, this law included a provision which exempted family 
members of current citizens from being included in the quota total.lxxi  The concept of family 
preference is something which has continued to be a part of modern immigration policy.   
It is important to point out that the use of the 1890 census figures to determine the 
allocation of visas strongly favored immigrants from Northern and Western Europe.  
Immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe faced greater difficulty in obtaining a visa and 
immigrants from Asia were virtually prevented from entering the United States.  The creation 
of the National Origins Quota system to favor Northern and Western European immigrants is 
a direct result of the role of these ethnic groups within the United States.  Irish and German 
ethnic groups were well established in the political process, enabling them to influence the 
direction of immigration policy.  In contrast, immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe 
had not been in the United States as long.  Since members of these ethnic groups were 
relative newcomers, they did not have as many second and third generation descendents who 
were citizens and could vote.  As a result of the political advantage held by Northern and 
Western European ethnic groups, they were able to influence the National Quota policies to 
favor new immigrants from their places of origin.   
While institutional changes and a rise in nativism certainly facilitated the 
implementation of the National Origins Quota System, it seems that the economic conditions 
of the United States in the early 1900s also made it possible to create a more restrictive 
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immigration policy.  At this point in America’s history there was little open territory within 
the continental United States and the population was shifting from a rural, agricultural 
society to one concentrated within America’s urban centers.  In short, the economic 
conditions of the country no longer necessitated a large labor force.  Daniel Tichenor reports 
that some reformers viewed the national origins quota system as “a necessary government 
response to the insecurities of modern industrial economic life.”lxxii  Reducing immigration to 
the United States was a way of both preventing America’s cities from becoming 
overcrowded slums and preserving a standard of economic well-being for American citizens.   
Furthermore, it is important to note that while the restrictive National Origins Quota 
System was being implemented against European immigrants, immigration from Latin 
America remained unrestricted.  The primary reason is that Southwestern growers relied 
upon migrant labor for agricultural production.  During the Depression, the Bracero Program 
was created to facilitate the employment of Mexican migrant labor.lxxiii  The economic needs 
of American agricultural production made it possible to exclude Latin American immigrants 
from the restrictive efforts of nativists.  While nativism has been a force within American 
immigration policy since the early days of the nation, the nativist movement has only been 
successful when the economic conditions of the country made it beneficial to have a 
restrictive immigration policy.     
The Modern Era of Immigration Policy   
The National Origins Quota system was ultimately repealed by Congress in 1965.  
The end of this approach to immigration policy was the result of several factors.  First, 
lawmakers recognized that America’s anti-Communist foreign policy would be strengthened 
by an immigration policy which welcomed political refugees.lxxiv  Also, the eugenic and 
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racial arguments used by restrictionists lost public favor because they were reminiscent of 
Nazi racismlxxv and had been discredited by the civil rights movement.lxxvi  Finally, the 
economic growth experienced after World War II allowed many “second-generation 
immigrants to move to the mainstream of American life,” and thus have greater political 
influence.lxxvii    
The termination of the National Origins Quota System represents another turning-
point in American immigration by both “mark[ing] a decisive turnaround in national policy 
and help[ing to] breathe life into a new era of mass immigration.”lxxviii  Immigration policy 
shifted from a quota system based on national origins to a seven-category preference system 
for allotting visas.lxxix  Instead of emphasizing an immigrant’s ethnic background, the new 
system gave preference to family members of United States citizens, to immigrants with 
skills needed by the U.S. labor market, and to those immigrants the United States wished to 
accept for humanitarian reasons.lxxx  Ending the system of accepting immigrants based on 
national origins eliminated the bias towards Western European immigrants that had been a 
part of U.S. immigration policy for nearly forty years.lxxxi  This had the effect of substantially 
increasing the number of immigrants originating from Latin America and Asia.  The 
increased number of immigrants from these regions in the middle of the 20th Century has had 
important implications on current immigration policy.  Just as the second and third 
generations of early Irish and German immigrants grew to exert significant political 
influence, so to have Asian and Hispanic ethnic groups come to play an important political 
role.         
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s debate over immigration policy centered on 
amending the preference system established in 1965.  These changes involved adding or 
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eliminating categories and adjusting the number of visas allotted to each category.  The 
family reunification categories experienced the greatest number of changes.  Since 1965, the 
number of visas allotted has been shifted to emphasize the reunification of nuclear, rather 
than extended, families.lxxxii        
Since the passage of the Hart-Celler Act in 1965, the two primary issues within 
immigration policy have been the need to develop a refugee policy and a growing concern 
about illegal immigration.  The emergence of these two issues has also called into greater 
question the extent to which immigrants either contribute or place a drain on society.  In 
terms of refugee policy, it is widely accepted that the process of “admitting refugees and 
granting asylum are humanitarian gestures” employed by the accepting country.lxxxiii  In its 
original form, the seventh preference category of the Hart-Celler Act reserved approximately 
10,000 visas annually for refugees escaping persecution in Communist countries,lxxxiv a 
provision which complemented the United States’ foreign policy during the Cold War.  Since 
1965, human rights advocates have worked to expand refugee and asylee policy to include 
those fleeing their countries of origin for a variety of political and economic reasons, not 
simply to escape Communism.lxxxv  Opponents of a liberal refugee policy argue that these 
immigrants often arrive in the United States with very little material possessions, thus they 
place a significant strain on the resources available to society.  While the debate over refugee 
policy has been an important issue since the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act, it seems that the 
issue of illegal immigration has had greater implications on the immigration policymaking 
framework.   
The concern about illegal immigration, which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, has 
led to new kinds of restrictions becoming a part of immigration policy.  The idea that illegal 
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immigration ought to be prevented is widely agreed upon; the controversy comes in 
determining how this should be done.lxxxvi  In recent decades several different methods have 
been employed to control illegal entry into the United States.  One of the largest efforts has 
been enforcement of land borders by increasing the size of the United States Border Patrol 
Force and erecting physical barriers such as fences in highly populated areas along the 
border.lxxxvii  This method has had limited success for two reasons; the immense size of the 
US border makes it difficult to maintain these physical barriers and many illegal immigrants 
enter the United States on student or tourist visas which they allow to expire.   
Another method in dealing with the issue of illegal immigration has been to reduce 
the economic appeal of the United States.  In 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration 
and Refugee Policy determined that the availability of jobs attracted immigrants to the 
United States. The attraction was so strong that many immigrants were willing to enter the 
country illegally.lxxxviii As a result of the commission’s report, the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 implemented employer sanctions.  These are financial penalties imposed 
on employers that hire undocumented workers.  Policymakers have also considered various 
methods of employment verification.  This type of system would allow employers to ensure 
that workers are legally eligible to work.lxxxix  Making it difficult for undocumented 
immigrants to gain employment reduces the incentives for entering the country illegally.  The 
implementation of employment verification requirements begins the trend of reducing the 
distinction between immigrant policy and immigration policy.  The purpose of creating a 
more strict employment verification system (an example of immigrant policy) was to deter 
illegal immigration (an immigration policy goal).  Politically speaking, the issue of illegal 
immigration is often used by supporters of a restrictive immigration policy to portray all 
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forms of immigration as detrimental to society.xc Thus, the growing concern over illegal 
immigration has had important implications for immigration policymaking as a whole.   
More generally, the issue of illegal immigration has inverted the traditional role of 
economic forces in immigration policy.  Historically, the desire to grow the American 
economy called for liberal immigration policies.  The problem of illegal immigration shifted 
economic influences to a desire to protect the American economy.       
Immigration: The Political Environment of the Early 1990s 
Given the force of economics within immigration policy, it is necessary to consider 
the extent to which the economic and political situation of the early 1990s led to the 
immigrant eligibility restrictions of PRWORA.  One of the primary causes of the 1996 
changes was a growing awareness of the societal costs of illegal immigration.  While it is 
impossible to determine the exact size and location of the illegal immigrant population, in 
1992 it was estimated that nearly 40 percent of undocumented immigrants resided in the state 
of California.xci  Given the concentration of legal and illegal immigrants within California, 
the state has been a trendsetter in policies dealing with the treatment of immigrants.   
The Case of California 
In the early 1990s, the state of California suffered from a weak economy.  This 
caused the state’s citizens to view the state’s legal and illegal immigrant populations as 
competition for employment.xcii  Frustration towards the immigrant community was further 
intensified when California governor Pete Wilson announced that during the 1992-1993 
fiscal year the state of California had spent approximately $4.8 billion in services to legal and 
illegal immigrants.xciii  California residents attributed many of the state’s economic problems 
to the state’s large immigrant population, comprised of both legal and illegal aliens.  
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Policymakers, such as Governor Wilson, blurred the distinction between legal and illegal 
immigrants in order to gain political support.   
In 1993, California residents were asked to name the greatest benefit the state 
received from foreign immigration.  43% of respondents stated that there were no benefits.xciv  
Similarly, 37% of Californians responded that they “favored strongly” the idea of stopping 
foreign immigration for a period of three years.xcv  It is clear that in the early 1990s, 
Californians strongly resented the presence of both legal and illegal immigrants.  This 
resentment caused Californians to push on both the local and federal level for changes in 
policies towards immigrants.    
On the local level, Californians showed their resentment towards immigrants with the 
Proposition 187 ballot initiative.  This proposal, otherwise known as “Save Our State,” 
sought to bar illegal immigrants from attending public schools and receiving health care and 
social services.  The California Coalition for Immigration Reform led the grassroots effort to 
put Proposition 187 on the November 1994 ballot.  Supporters of the proposal insist that it 
was not meant as an “anti-immigrant initiative” but rather as “an anti-illegal immigrant 
initiative.”xcvi  Despite this claim, Proposition 187 clearly represents the growing public 
sentiment against immigrants in general.   
Californian’s frustration with immigrants is also evidenced through actions taken by 
the state’s federal delegation.  In 1994, several California representatives introduced 
legislation which was aimed at immigrants.  Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-
Huntington Beach) proposed legislation which would have required public schools to 
“report… students who were illegal aliens or who did not have at least one parent who was a 
legal resident.”xcvii  Congressmen Gary Condit (D-Modesto) introduced a second piece of 
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legislation which would have allocated “$600 million to states and localities for costs related 
to the incarceration of illegal immigrants.”xcviii  Both the Rohrabacher and Condit proposals 
were defeated by relatively large margins.  Representative Jay Kim (R-Yorba Linda) 
introduced the third proposal, which was ultimately successful.  Representative Kim’s 
legislation prevented illegal immigrants from receiving “disaster assistance from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.”xcix   
In examining Proposition 187 and the three pieces of federal legislation, there are two 
levels of importance which must be noted.  First, and most obviously, all four proposals draw 
attention to the extent to which undocumented immigrants benefit from public services 
within the United States.  The four proposals all focus on the fact that society, through both 
the state and federal government, spends money on people who are not legally present in the 
United States.  The second level of importance is that three of the four pieces of legislation 
attempted to reduce public spending on illegal residents.  Representative Condit’s proposal 
was an attempt to shift the financial burden of illegal immigrants in the criminal justice 
system from the state to the federal government.  Proposition 187 and the Kim proposal both 
sought to deny assistance to illegal immigrants.  These three situations were attempts to 
lessen the financial burden of immigrants on the government.  Since the state of California 
was in an economic recession, public officials sought to reduce spending in any possible 
way.  While in California the trend of denying public services was limited to illegal 
immigrants, this strategy became a key element of the federal government’s ability to 
overhaul the nation’s welfare system.   
 According to Josh Bernstein, Senior Policy Director at the National Immigration Law 
Center (NILC), the anti-immigrant sentiment within California created the perception among 
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national lawmakers that such a sentiment existed across the country.c  This perception 
converged with a simultaneously existing public sentiment against welfare to result in 
PRWORA’s immigrant restrictions.     
 Prior to examining how welfare and immigration policies combined in the 1996 law, 
it is necessary to consider the role of modern ethnic groups in the formation of immigration 
policy.  It seems odd that ethnic groups did not work to counter the anti-immigrant sentiment 
of the early 1990s.  As evidenced by the actions of the Irish and German at the time of the 
National Origins Quota Act, ethnic groups have historically acted to influence immigration 
policy so that it is favorable to members of their ethnic group.  It seems that Hispanic ethnic 
groups did not engage in a similar strategy for several reasons.  First, as noted by Peter 
Skerry, the assimilation and ethnic politics of modern immigrant groups differ from “the 
classic pattern… exemplified by European immigrants.”ci  While previous immigrant groups 
worked for assimilation into American culture and society, modern immigrants often present 
themselves as racial minorities and seek to gain special privileges as a result of this minority 
status.cii  A second factor contributing to the absence of the Hispanic-American voice in 
opposition to the anti-immigrant sentiment of the early 1990s was division within the 
Hispanic-American community.  On issues related to immigration, there is no clear 
consensus within the Hispanic community.  Furthermore, there is a disconnect between the 
opinions of Hispanic-American leaders and average members of this ethnic group.ciii  The 
difficulty in creating consensus would have made it difficult for Hispanics to engage in any 
type of strategy to counteract anti-immigrant feeling.   
 While ethnic groups were not successful in preventing the PRWORA restrictions, 
they have since mobilized in response to the changes.  Many Hispanic-Americans were 
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angered by the restrictions and responded by voting in record numbers.  Between 1992 and 
1996 the Hispanic Democratic vote rose from 60 to 72 percent.  In the same years Asian 
Americans “increased their support for the Democratic ticket… from 29 to 43 percent.”civ  
The fact that these ethnic groups turned to the Democratic Party is in accordance with the 
traditional relationship between Democrats and ethnic minorities.  The mobilized response of 
such ethnic groups was a primary factor contributing to the limited restorations that have 
been enacted since 1996.   
Welfare: The Political Environment of the Early 1990s 
While anti-immigrant sentiment was centralized within California, public frustration 
with America’s welfare system existed nation-wide.  This frustration was a second important 
factor that caused the immigrant provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.   
During the early 1990s, stories of welfare fraud and abuse of benefits dominated the 
public’s understanding of how the welfare system functioned.  In 1991, a CBS News poll 
showed that 80% of Americans thought that welfare recipients were dependent on the 
welfare system.cv  Welfare was not popular with taxpayers, administrators found the program 
difficult to administer, and many recipients disliked the stigma attached with receiving public 
benefits.cvi  It was within this context that public officials began to debate various ways of 
reforming the welfare system.   
President Clinton’s Promise to “End Welfare as We Know It” 
 In January 1992, 90% of Americans believed that the welfare system needed to be 
changed.cvii  As a result of this public pressure, welfare reform became an important issue 
during the 1992 presidential campaign.  Democratic-party nominee, Bill Clinton, campaigned 
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on the promise to “end welfare as America knew it,” a promise which many believe 
ultimately forced Clinton to sign PRWORA in 1996.  During the first two years of Clinton’s 
presidency, the administration focused its efforts on reforming the nation’s health care 
system rather than working to reform welfare.  Clinton’s welfare proposal, the Work and 
Responsibility Act of 1994, was not introduced until June 14, 1994, only several months 
before the midterm elections.cviii  Clinton wanted to introduce his plan prior to the November 
1994 midterm elections so that Democratic candidates would not suffer as a result of him not 
acting on his campaign promise.   
 The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 contained provisions designed to appeal to 
both conservatives and liberals.  In an attempt to gain support from conservatives, the Clinton 
plan proposed implementing work requirements and imposing a two-year limit for the receipt 
of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits.cix   These more conservative 
approaches to reforming the welfare system were balanced by plans for job training programs 
and health and child care benefits, programs strongly supported by liberals.  The four main 
ideas guiding the Clinton administration’s welfare reform efforts were providing 
encouragements for people to move from welfare to work, “improving child support 
enforcement…, providing education and training needed to help welfare recipients find and 
keep jobs, and limiting the length of time a person can receive benefits in order to underscore 
that welfare should not be a way of life.”cx   
While Clinton did propose a welfare plan, it was the Republican proposal which was 
ultimately implemented.  This fact is often blamed on Clinton’s strategy of focusing on 
health care reform rather than welfare reform in the first few months of his presidency.cxi  
Clinton’s choice to focus on health care made it impossible for Congress to give his welfare 
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plan any attention once it was introduced, a mere six months before the November 1994 
midterm elections.  By this point, Clinton had already made himself vulnerable to criticism 
from the Republican Party.  Clinton’s choice to wait to act on this issue which had been an 
important part of his campaign, gave the Republicans greater credibility when they began 
their Contract With America campaign.   
Republicans and the Contract With America 
 During the campaign before the November midterm 1994 elections, the Republican 
Party staged a massive, coordinated attempt to regain control in the House of 
Representatives.  The central component of this effort was a ten-point document, known as 
the “Contract With America,” which became the “party’s campaign manifesto.”cxii  On 
September 27, 1994 the Republican Party staged a press conference in which over 300 
Republican incumbents and challengers signed onto this legislative agenda.  The Contract 
With America was a list of issues the GOP promised to address within the first 100 days of 
controlling the House.   
 The number three provision of the Contract With America called for reforming 
welfare, and specifically for imposing time limits on receipt of AFDC benefits.cxiii  The 
importance of the Contract With America within the welfare reform debate is a result of the 
complexity of what the Contract promised to accomplish.  In the Contract, Republicans 
promised to “cut taxes, increase military spending, and balance the budget – all at once.”cxiv  
Ultimately the Republicans were forced to make cuts to welfare programs in order to follow 
through on all of these promises.    
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Combined Frustrations: Immigrants and Welfare 
During much of the 1990s public frustration over welfare remained distinct from the 
existing anti-immigrant sentiment.  However, the law that was ultimately enacted makes it 
clear that these two frustrations combined to result in a public policy which makes a  
statement about the types of immigrants wanted within America.  Within the PRWORA law, 
Title IV deals specifically with the issue of restricting noncitizens from receiving public 
benefits.  This section of the law is introduced with a statement which reads,  
The Congress makes the following statements concerning national policy with respect
 to welfare and immigration:  
 (1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration
   law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes.   
 (2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United States that— 
  (A) aliens within the Nation’s borders not depend on public resources
    to meet their needs… and 
  (B) the availability of public benefits not constitute an incentive for
    immigration to the United States.cxv   
 
Given this introduction to the law, it is necessary to examine how the public concerns over 
welfare and immigration combined.   
A great deal of the debate over welfare reform centered on issues such as time limits 
and work requirements.  Although there was a rising anti-immigrant sentiment within the 
country, none of the ten provisions of the Contract With America dealt with immigration or 
policies towards immigrants already in the country.  Furthermore, anti-immigrant legislation 
at the state level, such as California’s Proposition 187, focused on illegal immigrants.  
Despite the early distinction between legal and illegal aliens in restricting welfare eligibility, 
welfare reform ultimately included provisions which prevented legally present immigrants 
from receiving public benefits.    
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During the early 1990s the frustration towards illegal immigrants stemmed from the 
realization that state and federal funds were being spent on this population which was not 
legally present in the United States.  As public attention was drawn towards the costs spent 
on illegal immigrants, the public became aware of spending on legal immigrants.cxvi  
Similarly, as efforts were made to divert financial resources from illegal immigrants, it 
became more acceptable to divert financial resources from legal immigrants.  Funding for 
portions of President Clinton’s welfare reform proposal came from changing eligibility 
requirements for legal immigrants to programs such as SSI and AFDC.  The changes in 
eligibility made by the Clinton proposal differed from those that were ultimately enacted 
both in the magnitude of what was cut and in the purpose of why the cuts were made.  The 
Clinton proposal simply extended the amount of time that a sponsors’ income would be 
deemed available to an immigrant from three to five years,cxvii a relatively small change 
compared to the complete disqualifications enacted by PRWORA.  Furthermore, the cuts 
made in the Clinton plan were used to fund other parts of the welfare reform proposal.   
When the Contract With America Republicans came to Congress in January 1995, 
they immediately began to work on what they had promised during the campaign.  House 
Republicans proposed the Personal Responsibility Act as their welfare reform plan.  Since 
this legislation was proposed in the context of the other Contract With America promises, 
elements of the legislation were designed to complement other Contract promises, even those 
not related to welfare.  Specifically, the Personal Responsibility Act was designed to produce 
a “net savings of about $40 billion over five years,” a savings that would allow the 
Republicans to fulfill their Contract promises to reduce the deficit and provide a tax cut.cxviii  
The savings within the Personal Responsibility Act came from eliminating the eligibility of 
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legal immigrants to many welfare programs.  Restricting immigrant eligibility to welfare was 
a “financing mechanism”cxix used by Republican lawmakers to fulfill their Contract With 
America promises.     
Although the immigrant eligibility restrictions ultimately included in PRWORA 
severely limited the extent to which immigrants could receive benefits, the provisions 
enacted were much less restrictive than what had been originally proposed in the Contract 
With America legislation.cxx  Immigrants rights groups, such as NILC, consider their 
advocacy efforts related to PRWORA to have been successful.cxxi  Mr. Bernstein explained 
that the perception of nationwide anti-immigrant sentiment caused lawmakers to fear the 
political consequences of supporting immigrants.  The perception of anti-immigrant 
sentiment resulted in an especially challenging situation for advocates.   
    The immigrant eligibility provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act are the result of several factors.  First, since the passage of 
the 1965 Hart-Celler Act, Americans have become more aware of the negative economic 
impact of immigrants.  This awareness turned to frustration when California, a state with a 
large immigrant population, experienced an economic downturn in the early 1990s.  Public 
frustration within California towards the costs of legal and illegal immigration caused 
lawmakers to perceive a nationwide anti-immigrant sentiment.  This perceived anti-
immigrant sentiment came at a time when lawmakers also felt political pressure to reform the 
nation’s welfare system.  The combination of public awareness about the costs of 
immigration and frustration with misdirected resources in the welfare system focused the 
debates over welfare reform on issues of economics.   
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While the restrictions imposed in 1996 were the result of the traditional force of 
economics within immigration policy, they represent a shift within this policy area by 
employing new methods to control the size of America’s immigrant population.  In the past, 
immigration policy focused solely on limiting the entry of immigrants.  The welfare 
restrictions of 1996 deal with the rights accorded to immigrants once they have entered the 
country.  This new method within immigration policy attempts to deter immigrants from 
coming to the United States by limiting the economic privileges that will be accorded to them 
once they arrive.  While PRWORA is clearly a welfare law, the introduction to Title IV 
identifies immigration policy goals.  Using welfare policy towards immigrants to accomplish 
immigration goals creates a new distinction between citizens and legally-present immigrants.  
Furthermore, this policy change eliminates any distinction between immigrant policy and 
immigration policy.       
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Chapter Three 
 
Case Study of State Responses 
 
New Choices for States  
As established in Chapters One and Two, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) changed the nature of both benefits and 
immigration policy by distinguishing between legally present immigrants and citizens in the 
distribution of benefits.  The law accomplished this both by changing federal eligibility 
guidelines and by increasing state flexibility in administering cash assistance.   
More specifically, PRWORA ended the Aid to Families With Dependent Children 
(AFDC) entitlement program and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF) block grant.  The change from an entitlement program to a block grant 
limited federal government spending on cash assistance.  A fixed amount is annually 
transferred from the federal government to the states to help state governments finance 
programs to assist low-income residents.  Since state governments would now receive a fixed 
level of funding, legislators believed that they needed flexibility in creating programs to 
address the specific needs of their communities.cxxii  As part of this flexibility, states became 
responsible for determining the eligibility of certain immigrant groups to the state-
administered, but federally-funded, TANF program.  In addition, states have gained influence 
over the extent to which immigrants can access welfare benefits because they have needed to 
respond to eligibility changes within the federally administered SSI and Food Stamp 
programs.   
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Eligibility to Federal Programs 
As a result of the change from an entitlement program to a block grant, states 
received increased flexibility in the creation and administration of cash assistance programs 
funded by the federal government.  First, states were given the ability to decide whether or 
not pre-enactment immigrants (those legally present in the United States on August 22, 1996) 
would be eligible for TANF and TANF-funded programs.cxxiii  The second state choice dealt 
with post-enactment immigrants.  Federal legislation barred immigrants that arrived in the 
United States after August 22, 1996 from receiving TANF funds for their first five years in 
the country.  Whether or not these immigrants would be eligible to receive TANF at the end 
of the five-year bar was a decision delegated to the states.cxxiv  The state flexibility in this 
area stems from the idea that states are best suited to understanding the needs of persons 
residing within their jurisdictions.  As a result, some states provide TANF to immigrants, 
while others do not.   
State Supplement Programs 
In addition to the choices specifically contained within the PRWORA legislation, 
states were faced with the unwritten choice of whether or not to create state-funded 
supplement programs to cover immigrants no longer eligible for the federal SSI and Food 
Stamp programs.  Furthermore, since post-enactment immigrants are unable to receive TANF 
for their first five years in the country, states needed to decide whether to provide aid for this 
group of immigrants.  State governments recognized that, although federal assistance was no 
longer available to many immigrants, the needs of these residents would not disappear.cxxv  
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As a result, some states have decided to allocate state funds to create replacement SSI, Food 
Stamp, and/or TANF programs.   
Eligibility to State Programs  
The final way that states have gained power in determining the extent to which 
immigrants are able to access welfare benefits applies to those states that have decided to 
create state-funded supplement programs to replace the loss of federal benefits.  If a state 
decided to implement state-funded programs, they are able to determine which groups of 
immigrants are eligible to their supplemental programs.  According to the Urban Institute’s 
report, Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for Immigrants under Welfare Reform, state 
governments have primarily used three methods to restrict access to state programs.  They 
have prevented immigrants from receiving welfare benefits by “limiting assistance for post-
enactment immigrants, limiting the population groups eligible…, and deeming the income of 
an immigrant’s sponsor to the immigrant.”cxxvi  In general, state programs are more available 
to immigrants that were in the United States at the time PRWORA was enacted.cxxvii  States 
have also tended to favor more vulnerable subgroups of immigrants such as children, the 
elderly, and the disabled.cxxviii  Finally, many state programs use sponsor-deeming to 
determine financial eligibility.  When immigrants enter the United States under the family-
preference categories, they are required to have a sponsor.  A sponsor is someone in the 
United States that promises to be financially responsible for the immigrant.  With sponsor-
deeming, the income of the sponsor is considered to be available to the immigrant, raising the 
income level of the immigrant so that they often do not meet the financial eligibility 
requirements to receive welfare benefits.   
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Case Study: State Responses to Welfare Reform 
States have responded in a variety of ways to the many choices created by PRWORA.  
Some states have made every effort to maintain the level of access to the welfare system that 
existed before the law was passed.  States with the most generous responses to PRWORA 
have allowed immigrants to participate in state-administered programs, and have created 
state-funded programs to supplement the loss of federal benefits.  The next tier of generosity 
includes states that have maintained immigrant participation in federally funded programs, 
but did not create state supplement programs.  Finally, the most restrictive states barred 
immigrants from state-administered programs and did nothing to supplement the loss of 
federal benefits.   
While it would seem that the size of a state’s immigrant population would have had 
significant influence on its decision regarding immigrant access to the safety net, this does 
not appear to have been the case.  States with large immigrant populations have the greatest 
need to maintain benefit availability to immigrants; however, these states also have the 
highest costs when they decide to meet this need.  This conflict has reduced the influence of 
the size of a state’s immigrant population on its decision of whether or not to allow 
immigrants to access welfare benefits.cxxix  In order to understand what factors have 
influenced state responses to PRWORA, this chapter will consist of a case study examining 
how four states have responded to the increased flexibility created by the law.   
Methodology For Determining Case Study States 
In response to the significant changes made by PRWORA, the Urban Institute, a 
nonpartisan research organization devoted to social policy, began the Assessing the New 
Federalism program.  This project is “designed to analyze the devolution of responsibility for 
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social programs from the federal government to the states…”cxxx As part of Assessing the 
New Federalism, researchers at the Urban Institute conducted a study of state welfare 
policies towards immigrants.  The data collected through this study was analyzed in the 
report Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for Immigrants under Welfare Reform. In 
summary, the researchers concluded that welfare reform has negatively affected the extent to 
which immigrants are able to access the social safety net.  They suggest that PRWORA 
“institutionalized” the idea of “treating noncitizens differently from citizens” and that 
although some states have attempted to maintain the availability of benefits, they “do not 
fully substitute for federal assistance.”cxxxi  Furthermore, the changes in immigrant eligibility 
brought by welfare reform have made it difficult for those immigrants that remain eligible to 
access the safety net.cxxxii   
In addition to explaining how PRWORA changed immigrant eligibility to welfare and 
identifying problems that have resulted from this change, the Patchwork Policies report also 
presents a significant amount of data regarding state choices affecting immigrants.  This data 
is presented in the report, State Snapshots of Public Benefits for Immigrants: A Supplemental 
Report to “Patchwork Policies.”  Data from this report will be used to analyze different state 
responses to PRWORA. 
Data from the State Snapshots report will first be used to select four states for the case 
study.  The first necessary piece of information to consider is the availability of the state’s 
safety net to immigrants.  The Urban Institute researchers grouped states into four categories 
of availability.  States in Category One are those that “made their safety nets most available 
to immigrants.”cxxxiii  In contrast, Category Four is comprised of states in which the safety net 
was “least available”cxxxiv to immigrants.  The second piece of information that will be used 
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in identifying the four case study states is the size of the immigrant population within a state.  
This piece of data is important to consider because the size of a state’s immigrant population 
does not seem to be related to the availability of benefits to immigrants within the state.  
Examining states with a variety of immigrant population sizes will make it possible to 
consider other factors that have influenced state decisions of whether or not to include 
immigrants in the state’s safety net.  The State Snapshots report ranks states based on the 
percentage of immigrants as part of the state’s population.  This piece of data, in addition to 
the ranking of safety net availability to immigrants, will be used to identify four states for the 
case study.     
After considering the abovementioned data, the four states that will be used for the 
case study portion of this paper are California, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Texas.  
California and Massachusetts are states that made the safety net “most available” to 
immigrant residents.  In general, this means that these states maintained immigrant eligibility 
to the federally funded TANF program and allocated state funding to create supplemental 
programs.  These states will be used to identify factors that influenced a state to provide 
benefits to immigrants.  Since these states have different immigrant population sizes, it can 
be assumed that factors other than immigrant population size influenced their decisions to 
provide benefits (See Chart 3.1 for numerical rankings and population percentages).  
Colorado was chosen because it has a moderate-sized immigrant population, but made more 
restrictive policy choices than California and Massachusetts.  Colorado maintained 
immigrant eligibility to the federally funded TANF program, but did not create state 
supplement programs.  Finally, Texas serves as a contrast to all of these states.  Although it 
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has a large immigrant population, it most severely restricted immigrant access to the safety 
net.  
Chart 3.1: Data Influencing Choice of Case Study States 
 Noncitizens as a percentage 
of state’s population (state 
rank) 
Availability of the safety 
net to immigrants (scale 1-
4; 1 = high availability) 
Californiacxxxv 19% (1) 1 
Massachusettscxxxvi 5% (14) 1 
Coloradocxxxvii 5% (15) 3 
Texascxxxviii 9% (7) 4 
 
California 
Welfare Programs Available To Immigrants 
 In the state of California welfare programs are widely available to legal immigrants.  
California has continued to include pre-enactment immigrants in TANF cash assistance, 
known as CalWORKS.  Post-enactment immigrants can also participate in CalWORKS after 
the five-year bar.  In addition, California provides benefits to those immigrants that are 
ineligible for federally funded benefits.  California maintains a state-funded TANF program 
for post-enactment immigrants until they qualify for federal TANF.  The state also has a 
supplemental SSI and Food Stamp program.  The state-funded programs are slightly 
restricted through sponsor-deeming and by limiting eligibility to subgroups of the immigrant 
population.  The state-funded SSI program (State Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants- 
CAPI) and food stamp program (California Food Assistance Program- CFAP) are available 
to all pre-enactment immigrants and some groups of post-enactment immigrants.cxxxix   
 
Chart 3.2: Welfare Programs for Immigrants in Californiacxl 
 
Cash Assistance  
TANF for pre-enactment immigrants YES 
Provision of TANF after five-year bar YES 
State-funded TANF during five-year bar YES 
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        Sponsor-deeming YES 
State-funded SSI for immigrants YES 
        Eligible Subgroups Pre- and certain post-enactment 
immigrants 
        Sponsor-deeming NO 
Food Assistance  
State-funded food program for immigrants YES 
         Eligible Subgroups Pre- and certain post-enactment 
immigrants 
         Sponsor-deeming    YES 
 
Politics and Welfare Reform 
 Considering California’s role in creating the perception of anti-immigrant sentiment 
in the early 1990s, something that contributed to the immigrant restrictions of PRWORA, it 
appears contradictory that California responded to the flexibility of PRWORA by 
maintaining immigrant access to the safety net.  Upon examination of the legislative process 
establishing these programs, it seems that many legislators were responding to backlash from 
the immigrant community.  California legislators were politically motivated to maintain 
immigrant access to welfare.   
Early in the 1997 legislative session, Majority Leader Antonio Villariagosa (D-Los 
Angeles) introduced AB 1197.  This bill proposed to establish a supplemental SSI and 
supplemental food stamp program by July 1, 1997.  These programs would be available to 
any immigrant that could not participate in the federal program solely because of the 
PRWORA restrictions.  On June 5, 1997, AB 1197 was approved with a 45-20 vote by the 
state Assembly.  At this point in the budget process, Democrats in the Legislature had not yet 
begun negotiations with Republican governor, Pete Wilson.cxli  Governor Wilson had been a 
strong supporter of the 1994 ballot initiative Proposition 187 which sought to deny illegal 
immigrants from receiving public benefits.     
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Given Wilson’s history of opposing immigrant eligibility to welfare, it is not 
surprising that the Democrats encountered significant resistance once the governor became 
involved in the budget debate.  The creation of state-funded programs for immigrants was 
one of many issues contained in the Democrats’ welfare reform proposal and opposed by 
Governor Wilson.  Wilson’s reason for opposing this provision was his fear that it would be 
too costly for California.  Furthermore, he believed that providing welfare for immigrants 
was a responsibility that should be fulfilled by the federal government.cxlii    
In order to counteract Wilson’s opposition, Villariagosa and other Hispanic 
legislators engaged in a public relations campaign to garner public support for their welfare 
plans.  In a July 22, 1997 op-ed piece, Assembly Speaker Cruz Bustamante (D-Fresno) 
accused the “governor and his Republican allies in the Legislature” of engaging in “the same 
kind of immigrant bashing that was used to win votes for Proposition 187.”cxliii  Democrats 
also used television advertisements to emphasize the image of Governor Wilson as anti-
immigrant and put pressure on him to support their welfare proposals.  These commercials 
were recorded in both Spanish and English and were aired in regions of the state heavily 
populated by Hispanic residents.  In one commercial Bustamante is featured saying, “I’m the 
grandson of immigrants who worked hard, obeyed the law and paid taxes.  Governor 
Wilson’s budget denies legal immigrants SSI after a lifetime of work.  That’s wrong.  Legal 
is legal.”cxliv  Aligning the Republican’s opposition of state welfare programs for immigrants 
with the anti-immigrant sentiment contained in Proposition 187 enabled Democrats to have a 
limited level of success with their proposals.   
While Villaraigosa’s AB 1197 became stalled in Senate negotiations, parts of his 
proposal were incorporated into AB 1576, a welfare reform bill sponsored by Assembly 
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Speaker Bustamante.  On August 11, 1997 the State Senate amended AB 1576 to include a 
provision allowing for the establishment of a food stamp program “for legal immigrants who 
are 65 years of age or older or children losing eligibility for food stamp benefits”cxlv as a 
result of PRWORA.  This program was set to begin on September 1, 1997 and would 
terminate on July 1, 2000.  AB 1576 became part of the final budget package passed by the 
Assembly in August 1997.  As a result the California Food Assistance Program (CFAP) was 
created.   
Although CFAP was more limited than what had been proposed by Villaraigosa, it is 
significant that Assembly Democrats were able to implement any type of welfare assistance 
for immigrants under Governor Wilson.  According to Lori True, an advocate working with 
the California Food Policy Advocates at the time CFAP was created, a primary reason that 
Democratic legislators had any success with their welfare plans is because the political 
sentiment in California had changed.  Instead of fearing the immigrant issue, Assembly 
Democrats led by Antonio Villaraigosa and Cruz Bustamante, realized that they could use it 
as “a potent organizing tool.”cxlvi  Proposition 187 had caused significant resentment of 
Governor Wilson.  According to a Los Angeles Times article, “To many Latino immigrants 
and their U.S.-born children, Pete Wilson became a symbol of anti-Latino prejudice.”cxlvii  In 
response to the intense anti-immigrant rhetoric espoused by Wilson and other Republicans in 
the early 1990s, many Latino immigrants became U.S. citizens, and thus gained the power to 
vote.cxlviii  Villaraigosa and Bustamante effectively captured this new voting bloc by framing 
the welfare debate in pro-immigrant/anti-immigrant terms.  The existence of a strong 
Hispanic voting bloc drastically changed California’s political environment.  The 
implementation of CFAP in 1997 marks only the beginning of this change.    
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While in 1997 the influence of the Latino voting bloc was just beginning to emerge, it 
is clear that by 1998 it had reached full-force.  During the 1998 budget process, the 
Legislature considered, and this time approved, a bill creating a replacement SSI program for 
immigrants.  AB 2779 established the Cash Assistance Program for Immigrants (CAPI).  
This program was available to pre-enactment immigrants that were no longer eligible for SSI 
because of the PRWORA restrictions.  When implemented in 1998, CAPI had a sunset date 
of July 2000.cxlix  Also during this legislative session, eligibility to CFAP was extended to 
include pre-enactment immigrants between the ages of 18 and 64.cl  These legislative 
accomplishments were both attributed to Antonio Villariagosa, who by this point had risen to 
the position of Speaker of the Assembly.cli  It is also significant to note that these provisions 
were enacted while Pete Wilson remained governor of California.  The ability of Democratic 
leaders to implement such legislation under Governor Wilson speaks to the power of the 
Latino vote.   
In the 1998 election cycle, Democrat Gray Davis was elected governor of California.  
With Democrats in control of both California’s executive and legislative branches, it became 
possible to expand the existing state welfare programs to include more immigrants.  AB 
1111, passed in 1999, deleted the July 2000 sunset dates for CFAP and CAPI.  This meant 
that a permanent, state-funded program would exist for California’s pre-enactment 
immigrants.  AB 1111 also expanded eligibility to CFAP and CAPI to include post-
enactment immigrants.  However, these immigrants would only be able to participate in the 
programs until September 30, 2000.  Immigrants enrolling in the programs under these 
provisions were referred to as “time limited” participants.  The following year, AB 2876 
extended the “time limited” enrollment date to September 30, 2001.  Ultimately, the “time 
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limited” provision for CFAP and CAPI was deleted from the state’s welfare code. This was 
accomplished with AB 989, legislation sponsored by Assemblymen Chan and Cedillo and 
passed in 2001.clii                   
While Republicans, such as Governor Pete Wilson, initially posed a threat to the 
ability of California Democrats to implement state-funded welfare programs for immigrants, 
the growing political power of Latinos ultimately enabled Democrats to be successful.  The 
political power of Latinos exploded in the late 1990s in backlash against the anti-immigrant 
policies supported by California Republicans in the early part of the decade.  California’s 
changed political environment is the primary reason that the state responded so generously to 
the increased flexibility of PRWORA.   
Massachusetts 
Welfare Programs Available to Immigrants 
 Like California, the state of Massachusetts responded to PRWORA by maintaining 
immigrant access to the safety net.  Massachusetts continued to allow pre-enactment 
immigrants to participate in the state’s TANF program, Transitional Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (TAFDC).  Furthermore, TAFDC is available to post-enactment 
immigrants after the five-year bar.  In addition to allowing the widest access to federal 
programs, Massachusetts created generous state-funded programs for those immigrants not 
able to receive federal benefits.  Supplemental TAFDC (STAFDC) is a state-funded program 
for immigrants ineligible for TAFDC solely because of the five-year bar.  In determining 
eligibility for STAFDC, sponsor-deeming is not used.  While Massachusetts did not 
specifically create a state-funded replacement for SSI, it did expand eligibility to its state-
funded Emergency Assistance for the Elderly, Disabled, and Children (EAEDC) program to 
immigrants.  EAEDC is the state’s old General Relief program that provides cash assistance 
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to elderly and disabled persons that are not eligible for federal-SSI.  The name of the 
program was changed to EAEDC in 1991.cliii  Because EAEDC was not specifically created 
in response to PRWORA, the Patchwork Policies report does not consider it a supplemental 
SSI program.  However, the program does primarily function in this manner.  Finally, the 
state of Massachusetts created a state-funded food stamp program with very broad eligibility 
requirements.  The program is available to all qualified immigrants and sponsor-deeming is 
not used to determine eligibility.         
Chart 3.3: Welfare Programs for Immigrants in Massachusettscliv 
 
Cash Assistance  
TANF for pre-enactment immigrants YES 
Provision of TANF after five-year bar YESclv 
State-funded TANF during five-year bar YES 
        Sponsor-deeming NO 
State-funded SSI for immigrants NO 
        Eligible Subgroups N/A 
        Sponsor-deeming N/A 
Food Assistance  
State-funded food program for immigrants YES 
         Eligible Subgroups All qualified immigrants  
         Sponsor-deeming    NO 
 
Politics and Welfare Reform 
In a December 18, 1996 Boston Globe article, then-Massachusetts governor William 
Weld (R) is quoted with the following response to Massachusetts’ decision of whether or not 
to provide welfare to immigrants.  Weld said, “It’s not a question of whether we’re going to 
step-in… It’s a question of what approach we take, and how much we’re going to spend.”clvi  
Weld’s statement is an apt summary of the political debate which established STAFDC and 
the State Supplemental Food Stamp program and expanded EAEDC to include immigrants.  
Whether or not Massachusetts would provide aid to immigrants no longer covered by federal 
benefits was never an issue.  Rather the debate was about how to best provide this assistance.   
  
 
62
By early 1997, both the governor and members of the Massachusetts Legislature had 
put forth proposals suggesting different methods of aiding the state’s immigrant population.  
The governor’s budget proposal, announced in early January, represented a starting-point for 
the debate.  His budget plan indicated that Massachusetts immigrants would be able to 
participate in TANF and included funding to aid immigrants losing eligibility to federal 
benefits programs.  Immigrants cut from federal SSI would be eligible to receive a monthly 
stipend of $338 from the state’s emergency aid program, Emergency Aid to Elders, Disabled, 
and Children (EAEDC).  To aid those immigrants losing federal food stamps, the governor 
proposed allocating $5.5 million to Emergency Food pantries.  Finally, the governor’s budget 
included a provision that would have made cash assistance available only to immigrants 
residing in Massachusetts on July 1, 1997.clvii   
While immigrant and welfare advocates were pleased with the general focus of the 
governor’s budget, they were opposed to several of the budget’s provisions.  Specifically, 
they were opposed to the method of providing food assistance and the absolute bar on 
immigrants arriving in the state after July 1, 1997.  These two issues, how to provide food 
assistance and the residency bar for new immigrants became the primary issues of debate 
during the creation of Massachusetts’ state-funded programs for immigrants.  Throughout the 
budget process, advocates worked with members of the Legislature to enact more favorable 
provisions.  Advocates from various organizations worked together under the Legislative 
Action Committee, a group coordinated by the Massachusetts Immigrant and Refugee 
Advocacy Coalition.  In order to focus their advocacy efforts, this group created the 
“Compact to Protect Massachusetts Immigrants,” a document outlining the group’s priorities 
for dealing with the immigrant eligibility changes resulting from federal welfare reform.   
  
 
63
 On the issue of food assistance, the Legislative Action Committee opposed the 
proposal to allocate money to food pantries because they thought that resources would not 
reach the targeted population of immigrants and refugees.clviii  Instead, these advocates 
supported the Nutritional Assistance for Families, Elderly, and Disabled Act, a bicameral 
piece of legislation proposing to allocate $13.2 million for food assistance to residents losing 
federal Food Stamps solely because of their immigrant status.  This legislation, sponsored by 
Senator Thomas Norton and Representative Kevin Fitzgerald, proposed to establish a 
program to distribute food vouchers to state residents not eligible for any other federal or 
state nutrition programs.clix  On the issue of the residency requirement, the advocates were 
completely opposed to any provision which would prevent new residents to the state from 
receiving benefits.clx 
 The next stage in the creation of Massachusetts’ state-funded programs for 
immigrants came in May and June of 1997.  Both the House and Senate had approved budget 
proposals, however the differences between these spending plans needed to be worked out in 
a conference committee.  The Senate’s version of the budget contained many of the 
“Compact to Protect Massachusetts Immigrants” priorities while the House version was more 
in line with what had been proposed by Governor Weld.  In a June 4, 1997 letter to Senate 
Ways and Means Committee Chairman, Senator Stanley Rosenberg (D), leaders of the 
Legislative Action Committee outlined the differences between the House and Senate 
versions of the budget and stated their priorities for the Conference Committee.  They 
supported the Senate plan which funded a state food stamp or food voucher program at $10 
million.  In contrast, the House proposal allocated $7 million to food banks.  On the issue of 
the residency requirement, the Legislative Action Committee urged members to “resist a 
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residency requirement that is excessively harsh or unconstitutional.”clxi  They specifically 
opposed the House proposal to impose a permanent bar on cash assistance to immigrants 
arriving in the state after May 1, 1997.  Instead, they supported the Senate version which 
imposed a 60-day residency requirement within the state of Massachusetts.  By July 17, 
1997, the Massachusetts Legislature had approved a state budget that included many of the 
goals of the Legislative Action Committee.  The FY 1998 budget allocated cash assistance, 
emergency aid, and food stamps to the state’s legal immigrant population.  Massachusetts’ 
generous response to PRWORA can be attributed to the willingness of public officials to 
provide some type of assistance to the state’s immigrants no longer eligible for federal 
welfare.   
Colorado 
Welfare Programs Available to Immigrants 
Compared to the actions of California and Massachusetts, the state of Colorado 
responded in a more conservative manner to the flexibility of welfare reform.  While 
Colorado does not absolutely prevent immigrants from receiving benefits, they have not 
specifically taken actions to maintain the level of access which existed before 1996.  In the 
state of Colorado, pre-enactment immigrants are still able to receive federal cash assistance 
through TANF.  Also, after the five-year bar, post-enactment immigrants are able to 
participate in this shared federal/state program.  While Colorado has maintained immigrant 
eligibility to welfare benefits where costs are shared with the federal government, the state 
has not allocated any state funding to replace other benefits for which immigrants are no 
longer eligible.  Colorado does not have state-funded cash assistance for post-enactment 
immigrants during the five year bar, a state-funded SSI replacement, or a state-funded food 
stamp program.  After examining the welfare programs available to immigrants in Colorado, 
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it seems that Colorado’s choices towards immigrants are in accordance with the lead taken by 
the federal government.  Colorado’s policies favor immigrants that were in the country when 
PRWORA was passed, and by limiting immigrant access only to cash assistance, their 
policies encourage immigrants to become self-sufficient.   
Chart 3.4: Welfare Programs for Immigrants in Coloradoclxii 
 
Cash Assistance  
TANF for pre-enactment immigrants YES 
Provision of TANF after five-year bar YES 
State-funded TANF during five-year bar NO 
        Sponsor-deeming N/A 
State-funded SSI for immigrants NO 
        Eligible Subgroups N/A 
        Sponsor-deeming N/A 
Food Assistance  
State-funded food program for immigrants NO 
         Eligible Subgroups N/A 
         Sponsor-deeming    N/A 
 
Politics and Welfare Reform 
   An examination of Colorado’s political debate in response to welfare reform 
indicates that providing some kind of welfare assistance to immigrants was a priority for 
lawmakers.  As early as February 1997, Colorado’s governor, Roy Romer (D), announced 
five priorities to be included in the state’s new welfare plan; providing assistance to legal 
immigrants was one item on this list.clxiii  Support for the governor’s desire to aid legal 
immigrants came in the form of SB 171.  This bill sought to aid legal immigrants by 
maintaining the most liberal eligibility standards to TANF as federal law would allow.  In 
other words, this piece of legislation stated Colorado’s intent to allow pre-enactment 
immigrants and post-enactment immigrants after the five year bar to participate in TANF.  
The bill was passed by Colorado’s legislature on June 3, 1997 and took effect on July 1, 
1997, less than a year after the passage of PRWORA.   
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 Given Colorado’s deliberate attempt to maintain immigrant eligibility to the 
federally-funded TANF program, it is necessary to examine why this state did not further 
expand the safety net to immigrants.  That is, why didn’t the state create state-funded 
replacement programs?  A likely explanation is that there was a lack of political pressure for 
lawmakers to specifically allocate state resources towards immigrants.  According to former 
Colorado governor, Dick Lamm (D), “immigration and immigrants are seldom major issues 
at the Colorado Legislature.”clxiv  Such sentiment is mirrored by members of Colorado’s 
minority rights community who suggest that, “the effect immigrants have on Colorado 
politics is probably pretty negligible.”clxv  Since immigrants are not a strong political force 
within Colorado, lawmakers most likely felt that by responding in a liberal manner to the 
choices specifically legislated by PRWORA, they could prevent possible political backlash.  
Of the many choices resulting from PRWORA, the only immigrant option specifically 
contained within the law dealt with eligibility to TANF.  The law did not explicitly say that 
states could also choose to create state-funded replacement programs.  Thus, Colorado’s 
response to PRWORA followed exactly the choices laid out within the legislation.  
Colorado’s response is more conservative than California and Massachusetts’ only because 
the state did not go above the minimum requirement.    
Texas 
Welfare Programs Available to Immigrants  
 According to the Patchwork Policies report, Texas is among the states in which 
welfare programs are “least available” to immigrants.clxvi  Compared with other states in this 
category, Texas has the largest immigrant population.  Considering the size of Texas’ 
immigrant population, its placement in the “least available” category makes the lack of 
availability of the safety net to immigrants seem even more restrictive.  
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 The reason for Texas’ inclusion in the “least available” category is clarified by 
examining the state’s responses to the various policy options created by PRWORA.  Texas 
does allow pre-enactment immigrants to participate in the TANF cash assistance program, 
however, the state does not extend this privilege to post-enactment immigrants after the five-
year bar.  Furthermore, Texas does not provide state-funded TANF to post-enactment 
immigrants during the five-year bar and there is no state substitute SSI program.  Texas does 
have a state-funded food stamp program, the State Immigrant Food Assistance Program 
(SIFAP), however eligibility is restricted only to elderly and disabled immigrants that were 
receiving federal food stamps when PRWORA was enacted in 1996.clxvii  Public policy 
researchers in Texas have called the state’s response to PRWORA “limited,” especially in 
comparison to “other states’ efforts.”clxviii     
Chart 3.5: Welfare Programs for Immigrants in Texasclxix 
 
Cash Assistance  
TANF for pre-enactment immigrants YES 
Provision of TANF after five-year bar NO 
State-funded TANF during five-year bar NO 
        Sponsor-deeming N/A 
State-funded SSI for immigrants NO 
        Eligible Subgroups N/A 
        Sponsor-deeming N/A 
Food Assistance  
State-funded food program for immigrants YES 
         Eligible Subgroups Pre-enactment elderly and disabled 
immigrants 
         Sponsor-deeming    NO 
 
Politics and Welfare Reform 
Texas’ limited response to the loss of federal benefits for immigrants can be 
attributed to the State Legislature’s inability to allocate the necessary funding.  Since 1996, 
there have been numerous attempts by members of the Legislature to implement programs 
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aiding immigrants, but none of these proposals has been successful.  The first response of 
Texas lawmakers to the PRWORA changes came in March 1997, the beginning of the 75th 
legislative session.  Legislation to provide nutritional assistance to legal immigrants was 
introduced in both the House (HB 3431) and the Senate (SB 1067).  In both chambers the 
legislation was referred to the appropriate committee, where the legislation was left pending 
for the remainder of the session.  
When the State Immigrant Food Assistance Program (SIFAP) was ultimately enacted 
in the fall of 1997, it was not accomplished through the legislative process.  Rather, Texas’ 
state-funded food stamp program was established under the direction of then-governor, 
George W. Bush (R).clxx  Governor Bush ordered the allocation of $18 million to “meet the 
most urgent needs”clxxi of those who had been cut from federal programs.  The $18 million 
was allocated as a set amount, and only to be used within a period of two years.  This meant 
that assistance would no longer be provided when the money was used or after the two year 
period.  In response to criticism of this fact, Governor Bush’s spokesperson Karen Hughes 
stated that, “if there is additional need, that’s something legislative budget writers can 
consider during the next legislative session.”clxxii  Considering the circumstances under which 
SIFAP was created, it is clear that it was never intended as a program to provide nutritional 
assistance to a wide-range of Texas’ immigrant population.  In 1998, after the limited federal 
restorations which returned federal food stamp eligibility to many SIFAP participants, Texas’ 
SIFAP program served only 336 residents.clxxiii  Also, the fact that it was established under 
executive order, rather than by legislative consent, reinforces the fact that Texas’ limited 
response to PRWORA has been caused by the Legislature’s inability to enact legislation.   
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The Legislature’s inability to enact legislation to providing aid to immigrants 
continued into the 76th Legislative session, which lasted from 1999-2000.  The SIFAP 
program was set to expire at the end of 1999.  At the end of 1998, it became clear that when 
SIFAP expired, only $7 million of the original $18 million allocated for the program would 
have been spent.clxxiv  In November 1998, the Center for Public Policy Priorities, a policy 
research organization in Texas, proposed several ways to use the $11 million in remaining 
SIFAP funds.  These proposals examined the costs of providing assistance to other subgroups 
of Texas’ immigrant population.  Ultimately, several pieces of legislation were introduced 
that would have used the extra $11 million, in addition to some additional funding, to expand 
and maintain SIFAP.  SB 1095 and HB 2702 proposed to expand the program to include 
legal immigrant children (in addition to the seniors and disabled already included in the 
program) and maintain SIFAP through the next biennium (2000-2001).clxxv  These pieces of 
legislation were slightly more successful than similar legislation during the previous 
legislative session.  In this case, the bills received approval in their respective committees, 
but they were left waiting to be placed on the calendar of each chamber.  As a result, the 
SIFAP program expired.   
Members of the State Legislature once again attempted to establish a state food stamp 
program for immigrants during the 77th legislative session (2001-2002).  HB 1218 was 
introduced in February 2001.  This bill would have provided benefits for elderly and disabled 
immigrants.  HB 1218 was approved by the Texas House and reported favorably by the 
Senate Health and Human Services Committee.  However, as with similar proposals, no 
action was taken on the bill by the entire Senate Chamber.   
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  During the 77th legislative session, the Texas State Legislature also briefly considered 
the issue of providing TANF to post-enactment immigrants after the federally imposed five-
year bar.  This did not become an issue until 2001 because any immigrant entering after 
August 22, 1996 would have had to wait until August 22, 2001 (five years) to have the 
possibility of being eligible for TANF.  At the time of PRWORA, states were required to 
submit to the federal Department of Health and Human Services a state plan indicating, 
among other things, whether the state would provide TANF to immigrants after the five-year 
waiting period.  Texas’ State Plan was originally drafted to indicate that the state would 
include post-enactment immigrants in TANF.  However, this language was changed at the 
last minute, and without any legislative debate.clxxvi   
State legislators revisited the issue in 1999, when states were required to submit a 
renewal of the State Plan.  In 1999, state legislators asked the Texas Department of Human 
Services to change the policy towards post-enactment immigrants.  Instead of rewriting the 
language to include post-enactment immigrants, the department changed it to say that “the 
state reserves the right to provide TANF to post 8/22/96 qualified immigrants after their 5-
year bar is satisfied, IF the legislature approves such a policy” (emphasis in original).clxxvii  
As a result of this language, it became necessary for the Texas Legislature to pass legislation 
in order for post-enactment immigrants to be able to receive TANF.  In March 2001, 
Representative Chavez (D-El Paso) filed HB 2395.  This bill would have changed the 
language of the Texas State Plan so that post-enactment immigrants could receive TANF.  As 
with other pieces of legislation proposing aid to immigrants, this bill received approval in 
committee, but was never considered by the entire House Chamber.     
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Analysis of State Responses 
 Given the variety of welfare programs available to immigrants in the four case study 
states, it is clear that no one factor influenced how a state responded to the increased 
flexibility of PRWORA.  In order to analyze the influential factors within a given state it is 
necessary to compare responses of states that appear to have similar characteristics.   
Massachusetts and Colorado 
 In both Massachusetts and Colorado immigrants represent a relatively small portion 
of the total population (5% for both states).clxxviii  A small immigrant population has two 
implications.  First, it is easy for voters and policymakers to overlook the needs of such a 
small segment of the population.  This, combined with the fact that immigrants themselves 
cannot vote, means that immigrants are unable to exert significant political pressure on 
elected officials.  The second implication is that if the state were to create state-funded 
welfare programs for this population, it would not incur a significant financial burden.  Given 
that both Colorado and Massachusetts dealt with these competing influences, the states 
responded very differently to PRWORA.   
 In Massachusetts, the welfare reform debate immediately focused on how to provide 
assistance to those immigrants losing eligibility to all federal welfare programs.  In contrast, 
Colorado’s debate centered exclusively on whether or not to allow immigrants to participate 
in TANF.  The possibility of providing assistance to immigrants losing eligibility to other 
welfare programs never entered the debate.  What was assumed in Massachusetts was not 
even considered in Colorado.  This seems to have been caused both by the relationship 
between the executive and legislative branches and the political ideology of each state.  In 
Massachusetts, welfare reform was conducted under a Republican governor and a very 
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powerful, Democrat-controlled Legislature.  In contrast, Colorado was governed by a 
moderate Democrat and a conservative Republican Legislature.clxxix  While Colorado 
governors had historically been able to strong-arm the Legislature, it seems that welfare 
reform occurred at a time when Colorado was shifting towards a conservative Republican 
era.clxxx  The shift of Colorado’s political majority made it difficult for Democratic Governor 
Roy Romer to implement liberal policies such as welfare for immigrants.  In contrast, the 
strength of Massachusetts’ Democrat-controlled legislature made it impossible for 
Republican Governor William Weld to strongly oppose such a plan.     
California and Texas 
 The most obvious similarity between California and Texas is that immigrants 
represent a significant portion of each state’s population (19% and 9%, respectively).clxxxi  
Furthermore, these states share a similarity in the composition of their immigrant population.  
California and Texas are both located along the US-Mexico border, and as a result each 
state’s immigrant population is primarily comprised of immigrants from Mexico and other 
Latin American countries.  This location means that both states deal with the issues of border 
enforcement and illegal immigration.  California and Texas have dealt with both the costs 
and benefits of immigration.  Despite the similar experience shared by these states, they 
responded in opposite ways to the choices of PRWORA.   
In California, welfare reform occurred at a time when Democrats were gaining 
significant power.  The party controlled both chambers of the State Assembly.  In contrast, 
Texas Democrats were losing their traditional stronghold on political offices to members of 
the Republican Party.  Texas’ welfare plan was created under a Republican governor and a 
divided state Legislature; Republicans controlled the state Senate and the state House had a 
  
 
73
slim Democratic-majority.  The partisan composition of each state’s legislature explains the 
fate of the various welfare proposals.  In California, proposals to provide welfare for 
immigrants received easy approval in the Assembly and encountered opposition once they 
were sent to the Republican governor.  In the Texas Legislature, legislation was proposed, 
considered in committee, and then ignored by the entire chamber.  In the several instances 
when legislation was approved by the Texas House, the Texas Senate then ignored it.  Given 
the Republican control of the state Senate, this makes sense.  The shifting of dominance by 
one party to the other that occurred in both California and Texas at the time of welfare 
reform was one factor that caused the different responses.        
 Another factor influencing the different responses to PRWORA was the relationship 
that existed between each state’s GOP and Hispanic voters.  In his book, Mexican-
Americans: The Ambivalent Minority, Professor Peter Skerry argues that Texas Hispanics4 
engage in politics differently than their counterparts in California.  The different style of 
politics in each state has caused each state’s GOP to relate to the state’s Hispanic population 
differently.  Peter Skerry argues that the nature of political life in general is different in 
California and Texas.  For example, in Texas it is still possible to get elected by “tirelessly 
walking precincts,”clxxxii while in California politicians must deal with a political system 
dominated by “money, media, issues, and highly paid professionals.”clxxxiii  Given these 
varying political environments, Hispanics have had more political success in Texas than in 
California.  The success of Texas Hispanics in turn has “serve[d] to moderate the deep-seated 
resentments….[that] have built up over generations.”clxxxiv  In contrast, in California political 
                                                          
4 In his book Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority, Professor Peter Skerry examines political 
activities of Mexican-Americans in both Texas and California.  Although Skerry distinguishes between 
Mexican-Americans and Hispanics, he acknowledges that Mexican-Americans comprise the majority of the 
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success goes to those that are “capable of capturing the attention of dominant elites.”clxxxv  
This has impacted the overall political role of Hispanics in California because leaders that are 
able to achieve success are most often those that are willing to “define their group in racial 
minority terms.”clxxxvi  In short, California Hispanics tend to define themselves as a racial 
minority, while Hispanics in Texas do not.    
 In the case of welfare reform, California Assembly Democrats used the racial 
minority status of California Latinos as a tool to effectively organize this constituency to put 
significant public pressure on elected Republicans.  Democrats were aided in this effort by 
the contentious relationship that already existed between the California GOP and the state’s 
Hispanic electorate.  Although Texas Republicans were similar to California Republicans in 
that they did not support state-funded benefits for immigrants, Texas Democrats could not 
employ the strategies of California Democrats because the Texas GOP managed to maintain 
a positive relationship with Hispanic voters.  According to Republican analyst Tony Quinn, 
“It never would have occurred to the Texas GOP… to run against immigrants, since the 
Latino population… forms much of the state’s business and social establishment and is 
growing in wealth and influence.”clxxxvii  By engaging in immigrant bashing, California 
Republicans reinforced the racial minority approach taken by California Hispanics.  In 
contrast, Texas Republicans were working to gain the Latino vote.  This left Texas 
Democrats unable to engage in significant public persuasion.  Because the Texas GOP 
represented the interests of Latino middle-class voters, these former immigrants were less 
concerned about the status of current immigrants.  In contrast, the anti-immigrant policies of 
the California GOP had angered California Hispanics and reinforced the constituency’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hispanic population in these states.  For this reason, I will use his theories to understand the political role of 
Hispanics more generally.   
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definition of itself as a racial minority.  Democrats seized upon this frustration and built 
public support for their policies.  The nature of Hispanic politics in each state in combination 
with the changing roles of the Democrat and Republican parties in relation to each state’s 
Hispanic voters was a second influential factor resulting in the different levels of public 
assistance available to immigrants in California and Texas.      
 The final factor of the different levels of welfare available to immigrants in California 
and Texas seems to be the traditional welfare generosity of each state.  While California has 
typically provided a high level of benefits to needy residents, Texas has not.  This precedent 
influences what policymakers are willing to enact and what the public will consider 
acceptable.  Since Texas has traditionally not been generous in welfare benefit distribution, 
extending benefits to immigrants was outside the range of possible policy choices.  In 
contrast, since California has historically been one of the more generous of the fifty states, 
extending public benefits for immigrants merely continued this trend.          
General Trends  
 Considering the various factors that have influenced the four case study states, it is 
clear that the tendency to maintain immigrant access to the social safety net is primarily 
influenced by the political leaning of a given state.  Massachusetts has always been a liberal, 
Democratic stronghold.  While California had been dominated by Republican thinking, 
actions of the state’s Republican leaders forced the emergence of a liberal, Latino voting 
bloc.  In contrast, welfare reform occurred at a time when Colorado and Texas, formerly 
dominated by the Democratic Party, were shifting to the control of the GOP.  The ideological 
environment of these states established limits for the possible level of assistance for each 
states’ immigrant population.   
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Conclusion 
  
Federalism and Devolution 
 
 The varied responses to the increased state flexibility in the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 reinforce a fundamental component of 
American federalism.  That is, that power is ultimately derived from the states.  In order to 
understand how PRWORA emphasizes this, it is necessary to consider what makes American 
federalism unique and the significance of the law’s devolutions in the areas of immigration 
and welfare policy.   
American Federalism  
Through the act of ratifying the United States Constitution, the thirteen independent 
state governments consented to the formation of one national government.  As a result of 
their consent, a federal system was created.  Within this system, state governments delegate 
their authority over certain governmental functions to the federal level of government.  The 
specific powers given to the federal government are enumerated within Article One of the 
Constitution.  In addition, the Tenth Amendment reserves all nonenumerated powers for the 
states.  Despite the fact that the Constitution identifies and limits specific powers of both the 
state and federal governments, there is considerable policy area in which both levels of 
government seem to have jurisdiction.   
The shared authority over many policy areas stems from ambiguity within the 
Constitution.  Although the Tenth Amendment reserves all nonenumerated powers for the 
states, Article 1 Section 8 gives the federal government the broad power to create any laws 
necessary for carrying out the enumerated powers.clxxxviii  Upon comparison of these two 
Constitutional provisions, it appears that the Framers of the Constitution wanted the state and 
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federal governments to share authority over many governmental functions.clxxxix  This shared 
authority creates debate when the primary question of federalism is asked.  That is, which 
level of government should be responsible for a given activity, and which level of 
government should fund government functions?cxc  Within the American federal system, 
Constitutional ambiguity makes it difficult to answer this question for policy areas such as 
welfare and immigration.   
Throughout American history there have been periods of both federal supremacy and 
state power.  In the decades immediately following the ratification of the Constitution, 
Congressional action and Supreme Court decisions of the Marshall Court centralized power 
within the federal government.cxci  This era ended in 1835 with the death of Chief Justice 
John Marshall.  In the following decades, national power was diminished as Court decisions 
increased state police powers and enabled states to regulate commerce concurrently with the 
federal government.cxcii  Federal supremacy was once again asserted beginning in the New 
Deal and lasting through the Civil Rights movement and Great Society programs of the 
1960s.  During the Nixon presidency the “New Federalism” movement sought to “revitalize” 
state and local governments.cxciii  Through the New Federalism, states and localities gained 
control of implementing federally funded programs.  During the 1980s the existence of 
categorical grant programs supported the centralization of power within the federal 
government.cxciv  At the time of the welfare reforms of the 104th Congress, significant power 
was centralized within the federal government.              
Devolution 
 
Many policies enacted by the 104th Congress seem to represent a shift in American 
federalism.  Quite often, the era from 1996 – 1997 is referred to as the “Devolution 
Revolution.”cxcv  Within a federal system, devolution is the process of shifting power and 
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responsibility of a given state function from the federal government to the local level 
(whether this be the state, county, or city).  When devolution occurs, local governments gain 
significant control over the creation and implementation of a given policy.  Simultaneously, 
local governments must also bear the financial burden of performing the given function.   
 Generally speaking, there are advantages and disadvantages to devolution of 
responsibility from the federal government to the states.  Those that favor a greater local role 
within society argue that local governments are more familiar with the needs of their 
community.  This knowledge enables local governments to allocate scarce resources in the 
most efficient manner.cxcvi  It has typically been thought that state and local governments are 
best suited to determine policies which are specific to each community, such as safety and 
transportation.   
 In contrast, opponents of devolution cite the possibility for discrimination and the 
tendency of states to not take responsibility as their reasons for supporting a stronger federal 
role.  In America’s history, the “struggles over the distribution of federal power also 
represent conflict over which cultural values will be ascendant in the United States.”cxcvii  If 
states have significant power, it becomes possible for them to institutionalize preference or 
discrimination towards specific groups of their population.  In order to prevent (or remedy) 
locally institutionalized discrimination, federalism can be used as a way of addressing ethnic 
and cultural conflict.cxcviii  There is no better example of this than the policy choices made by 
Southern states after the end of slavery.  In nearly every policy area, African-American 
citizens were discriminated against.  The federal government was able to reduce this 
discrimination with the passage of the Civil Rights Act.  Opponents of devolution also fear 
that states will be reluctant to fulfill their delegated responsibilities, beginning a so-called 
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race to the bottom.  A central understanding within this argument is that states will want to 
have policies similar to each other.  If one state reduces the benefits and services available to 
residents, it is likely that other states will follow suit.  States tend to create similar policies so 
that one state does not become a magnet, attracting new residents that wish to take advantage 
of the state’s generous or lenient policy in a given area.  Opponents of devolution fear that by 
giving state governments greater control over policy, they will slowly reduce what is 
available to citizens, so that ultimately all states are equal in offering the lowest level of 
services.  A strong federal government can prevent a race to the bottom by establishing 
minimum levels of what a state must provide to its residents.      
Federalism and Welfare Policy  
Within the realm of welfare policy, the institution of federalism makes it necessary to 
ask, which level of government is responsible for ensuring that all citizens have access to a 
minimum level of income, health care, nutrition and housing?  For much of American history 
the federal government has worked through the states to accomplish welfare goals.  The 
federal government has been responsible for funding and determining eligibility while state 
governments have been responsible for program administration.  At the time of their creation, 
the SSI and Food Stamp programs maintained federal supremacy over state governments.  In 
contrast, when AFDC was created states had significant control over eligibility and benefit 
levels.  Although the federal government did not have universal control over AFDC when it 
was terminated in 1996, it had gained significant influence over the program.  In 
combination, the federal government’s roles in AFDC, Food Stamps, and SSI meant that it 
had primary control over welfare policy at the time of welfare reform.   
Federalism and Immigration Policy 
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In the area of immigration policy, the federalism question is, which level of 
government is responsible for regulating the nation’s borders and conferring citizenship upon 
residents?  In theory, matters of foreign affairs and naturalization are the exclusive 
responsibility of the federal government.cxcix  In practice however, early Congresses left a 
great deal of immigration policymaking to individual states.  There were broad requirements 
for naturalization but states had the freedom to determine issues of regulation.  This changed 
in the late 1800s when responsibility for immigration matters was specifically delegated to 
the federal Treasury Department.  The federal government continued to consolidate its power 
over immigration until the 1996 reforms.  At the time of PRWORA, the federal government 
had sole responsibility for matters pertaining to immigration and citizenship.     
Welfare Reform and Devolution: Immigration Policy 
 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
changed federal supremacy over welfare and immigration policy by devolving significant 
powers to the states.  While it is commonly accepted that PRWORA lessened federal 
responsibility over welfare policy, its effect on immigration policy is an issue of greater 
controversy.  In order to analyze the law’s effect on immigration policy, it is helpful to again 
examine the new powers over immigrant eligibility to welfare which PRWORA delegated to 
the states.   
As first identified in Chapter Three, PRWORA increased states’ ability to determine 
immigrant access to the safety net by allowing states to determine: (1) whether they will 
provide certain federal benefits (TANF) to legal immigrants that were in the United States on 
August 22, 1996; (2) whether they will provide federal benefits to post-enactment 
immigrants after the five-year bar; (3) whether they will fund cash assistance for post-
enactment immigrants during the five-year bar; and (4) the level of access they will allow to 
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state-funded replacement programs.cc  In addition to increased power in determining 
immigrant eligibility to the welfare system, states are also faced with the increased 
responsibility of funding any benefits which they extend to noncitizens.   
Given the new state powers, both in determining immigrant eligibility to welfare and 
in funding any participation of immigrants in the welfare system, it is clear that the state 
governments have gained significant control over the treatment of noncitizens that reside in 
their jurisdictions.  This control increases the extent to which noncitizens are treated 
differently from citizens, a policy area which had previously been solely the responsibility of 
the federal government.  The new responsibilities under PRWORA are significant because 
before states played no role in defining the meaning of full citizenship.  PRWORA gave 
states new influence into this important policy area.  
In order to more fully understand the extent to which PRWORA has devolved some 
of the federal responsibility over the status of immigrants to state governments, it is helpful 
to examine an argument in support of the opposing view.  That is, that PRWORA gave few 
new responsibilities to the states.   
In an article entitled “The state of American federalism: 1996-1997,” Sanford F. 
Schram and Carol S. Weissert question the commonly held idea that PRWORA delegated 
significant control over social policy to the states.  Instead, they suggest that the 1996 
reforms might actually have reinforced federal supremacy in the formation of immigration 
and welfare policy.cci   
 Schram and Weissert’s argument can best be summarized with their statement, “the 
ironies of devolution suggest that as we remake federalism we reinscribe it; federalism 
cannot help recreating itself even as it changes.”ccii  The authors recognize that PRWORA 
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devolved significant responsibility to the state governments, but they identify provisions 
within the law enabling the federal government to maintain significant control over certain 
aspects of welfare.  To further support their argument, Schram and Weissert identify several 
other policy areas in which reforms made during the “Devolution Revolution” might actually 
“dilute” the effects of the devolutionary policies.cciii   
Upon closer examination of changes made to immigration policy within the era of the 
“Devolution Revolution” it becomes clear that Schram and Weissert’s argument cannot be 
strongly applied to this policy area.  In addition to PRWORA, the other immigration-related 
piece of legislation passed by the 104th Congress is the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA).  This law, passed after PRWORA, 
strengthens efforts to fight illegal immigration and establishes more stringent financial 
requirements for the admission of sponsored legal immigrants.cciv  Unlike PRWORA, 
IIRAIRA relies on the federal level of government to accomplish its goals.  For example, 
IIRAIRA increases the minimum income level required of individuals who wish to sponsor 
family members for immigration to the United States.  This provision of the law was to be 
enacted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Consular Offices of the 
State Department, the federal agencies responsible for issuing visas.  IIRAIRA also allocates 
greater resources to increase the size of the Border Patrol, a division of the INS.  If Schram 
and Weissert’s argument were to hold, reforms such as those within IIRAIRA would have to 
diminish the devolutionary impact of PRWORA within immigration policy.        
Closer examination of IIRAIRA and PRWORA indicates that the federal-
strengthening provisions of IIRAIRA were not strong enough to dilute the devolution 
provisions of PRWORA.  IIRAIRA makes only a slight change to the sponsorship process 
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and allocates resources to protect the border.  In contrast, PRWORA fundamentally 
distinguishes legally present noncitizens from citizens.  After making this distinction, 
PRWORA gives state governments some influence in this important policy area.  It seems 
the PRWORA’s changes most significantly alter the experiences of immigrants to America.   
The new responsibilities, which PRWORA devolves to the states, represent a break in 
the federal nature of immigration policy.  During America’s early years states had possessed 
significant control in this policy area.  However, since the late 19th Century control had been 
firmly maintained by the federal government.  By devolving some immigration control to the 
states, PRWORA makes it difficult for the United States to achieve a unified immigration 
policy.   
Welfare Reform and Devolution: The Impact on Federalism          
 In addition to the changes made in the area of immigration policy, the immigrant 
provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
represent significant changes in several other policy areas.  The restrictions mark the first 
time that the federal government firmly acted upon its right to distinguish between citizens 
and non-citizens in the distribution of public benefits.  Federal welfare laws had previously 
made little distinction between these groups.  This distinction did not exist on the state level 
because states were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of citizenship status.  Also, 
by devolving these new immigration and welfare policy-making powers to the states, 
PRWORA gives state governments significant control in these important policy areas.  New 
state influences in these areas, reinforces a fundamental truth within American federalism.   
 As a result of the PRWORA changes, states have gained influence in policy areas that 
had traditionally been the sole responsibility of the federal government.  Opponents of such 
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devolution cite the possibility for a race to the bottom as their reason for supporting a strong 
federal government.  However, as evidenced in Chapter Three, states have responded in a 
variety of ways to their new responsibilities in the areas of welfare and immigration policies.  
While states such as Texas and Colorado have followed the federal trend established by 
PRWORA, other states, such as California and Massachusetts, have worked to maintain the 
level of immigrant eligibility to the safety net that existed before welfare reform.  Clearly, a 
race to the bottom has not occurred.   
 The variety of state responses seems to have been caused by the political environment 
that is specific to each state.  This political environment includes the traditional generosity of 
benefits given by the state, the partisan leaning of the state, and the role of ethnic and 
minority interest groups within the state’s political process.  Given these factors, it was 
impossible for states such as California and Massachusetts to reduce the benefits available to 
immigrants to the levels of Texas and Colorado. 
 The role of each state’s political environment prevented the race to the bottom that 
was feared by many opponents of devolution.  That a race to the bottom did not occur 
indicates that many differences exist between the fifty states which comprise the United 
States of America.  Within each state there are varying economic and political forces that 
influence the state’s elected officials and electorate in different ways.      
 It is important to understand how and why states responded to PRWORA, because 
these responses reinforce a fundamental aspect of American federalism.  States responded 
differently because they face different political pressures that are unique within each state. In 
a sense, a race to the bottom would have preserved American federalism.  While the policies 
enacted would have been the result of individual decisions by the fifty states, there would be 
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one policy regarding immigrant eligibility to welfare.  In contrast, different political and 
economic factors in the fifty states caused varied state responses.  This means that within the 
United States there are fifty different policies regarding immigrant eligibility to welfare.   
That variety exists in such an important policy area as immigration emphasizes an 
inherent component of American federalism.  Within this federalism, states have influence in 
creating policies which are fundamental to the definition of the American state.  This serves 
as a reminder that America is a nation where power is derived from the states.  While the 
official seal of the United States of American is inscribed with the quote “E Pluribus Unum” 
(From Many One), an important part of American political culture is that the power of the 
one nation is derived from the many states and the many different people who inhabit these 
states.  The varied state responses to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, emphasize these differences. 
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